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The Elkins Legislation: Will
California Change Family
Law Again?
Steven K. Berenson*
INTRODUCTION
For many years, California has been at the forefront of
innovations in the area of family law. For example, in 1970,
California became the first state to apply a no-fault law relating
to dissolutions of marriage.1 California was the first state to
mandate mediation in child custody and visitation disputes.2
California was also the first state to recognize that unmarried
cohabitants might have rights to share in property accumulated
by their partner during the course of their relationship.3
Recently, California enacted what may prove to be the most
significant changes to its Family Code in the last two decades.4
While the legislation contains a large number of changes, three of
the changes will be the focus of this article. First, California law
now contains a preference for the introduction of live testimony
in court hearings in family law matters. Second, the legislation
modifies the role of minor’s counsel in child custody proceedings
to more closely resemble that of an attorney for one of the adult
parties to a lawsuit, than that of a guardian ad litem. Third, the
legislation increases the likelihood that children will testify in
custody proceedings.5
* Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego, California. The
author wishes to thank Nicola Boothe-Perry, Judith Fox, Michele Gilman, and Mary
Spector for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Deanna Sampson for continuing
support.
1 See Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 291, 291–92 (1987).
2 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1552 (1991).
3 Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal
Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 314 (2008).
4 See infra Part III. The California Legislature passed two bills amending the
California Family Code. See Assemb. B. 939, 2009–2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010);
Assemb. B. 1050, 2009–2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010).
5 See infra Part III.
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These changes are significant because they represent a clear
break from a decades-long trend in family law, both in California
and across the entire country away from reliance on traditional
methods of adversary litigation in resolving family law disputes,
particularly in cases involving issues of child custody and
visitation. This trend has been so dramatic that it has been
described by scholars as a “paradigm shift”6 and a “revolution.”7
Indeed, the move to no-fault divorce in California, and then
elsewhere across the country, as well as the introduction of
mandatory mediation in child custody cases, first in California
and then elsewhere across the country, represent major
contributions to the trend away from adversarial litigation in
family law cases. Other examples of this trend include the
advent and spread of collaborative divorce methods, parenting
coordination, high conflict couples counseling, and hybridmediation-evaluation processes.8
The California legislative
changes that are the focus here represent a stunning reversal of
course for a state that has led the movement away from
traditional adversary litigation methods in family law cases and
represent a movement back in the direction of resolving family
law matters in California through traditional adversary
litigation.
The genesis of the statutory changes in discussion here lies
in the recent decision of the California Supreme Court in the case
of Elkins v. Superior Court.9 Elkins involved a dissolution of
marriage action from Contra Costa County, California.10
Pursuant to local rules of court, all direct testimony in family law
trials was to be provided in the form of written declarations,

6 See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Revitalizing the Adversary System in Family Law, 78 U.
CIN. L. REV. 891, 894 (2010); ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY:
INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 175 (2004) [hereinafter SCHEPARD,
CHILDREN, COURTS]; Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family:
Implications of a Paradigm Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 363 (2009).
7 Deborah J. Cantrell, The Role of Equipoise in Family Law 2 (Univ. of Colo. Law
Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-11, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1805927.
8 See, e.g., John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss:
Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce
Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 280, 280–88 (2004) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of mediation, collaborative law, and cooperative law in family law proceedings); Peter
Salem, Debra Kulak & Robin M. Deutsch, Triaging Court Services: The Connecticut
Judicial Branch’s Family Civil Intake Screen, 27 PACE L. REV. 741, 745 (2007) (discussing
high conflict counseling, hybrid mediation-evaluation processes, and collaborative divorce
methods); Andrew Schepard & Peter Salem, Foreword to the Special Issue on the Family
Law Education Reform Project, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 513, 516 (2006) (noting the rise of
collaborative dispute resolution in family law cases); Singer, supra note 6, at 364 & n.5.
9 Elkins v. Superior Court, 163 P.3d 160 (Cal. 2007).
10 Id. at 161.
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though cross-examination would be permitted at the hearing.11
Additionally, all trial exhibits were required to be filed prior to
the hearing, with the evidentiary basis for each exhibit set forth
in the written declarations.12 In Elkins, the husband, who was
not represented by counsel, ultimately failed to comply with the
aforementioned local rules by not submitting any admissible
evidence for the court to consider in the divorce trial.13 Given the
absence of any evidence submitted on behalf of the husband, the
trial court, not surprisingly, issued a ruling that favored the wife
with regard to each of the disputed issues.14 On appeal,15 the
California Supreme Court ruled that the superior court’s local
rules violated state statutes relating to hearsay evidence and
affording litigants a “day in court.”16 The high court struck down
the local court’s rules,17 and reversed the judgment in the
dissolution of marriage case, remanding the case for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion.18
More importantly for present purposes, numerous counties
around California had adopted local rules that were similar to
those that were struck down in Elkins.19 The purpose behind
such rules was to increase efficiency and the timely resolution of
cases in light of the crushingly large caseloads in family courts
around California.20
While the California Supreme Court
acknowledged the legitimacy of these goals, it went on to
conclude that courts’ bona fide interests in efficiency cannot
trump individual litigants’ right to fair judicial proceedings.21 In
any event, recognizing that the issues involved went well beyond
the interests of solely the parties to the Elkins case, the court
recommended that the California Judicial Council set up a task
force to review issues relating to the competing goals of efficiency
and access to justice in California’s family courts.22
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163–64.
Id. at 165.
The intermediate appellate court summarily denied Mr. Elkins’ petition for a writ
of mandate or prohibition. Id.
16 Id. at 169, 170. Thus, the court was able to avoid ruling on Mr. Elkins’ claims that
the local rules violated his constitutional rights to due process of law. Id. at 170 (“The
conclusion we reach also permits us to avoid the difficult question whether the local rule
and order violate petitioner’s right to due process of law . . . .”).
17 Id. at 171.
18 Id. at 178.
19 Id. at 177 (“A recent statewide survey reflects a similar concern with court
procedures that do not permit family law litigants to tell their story . . . .”).
20 Id. at 175–77.
21 Id. at 176–77 (“That a procedure is efficient and moves cases through the system
is admirable, but even more important is for the courts to provide fair and accessible
justice.”).
22 Id. at 178 n.20.
11
12
13
14
15
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The Judicial Council followed the court’s recommendation,
and established the Elkins Family Law Task Force (hereinafter
“Elkins Task Force” or “Task Force”).23
The Task Force
contained a broad representation of actors from within the family
law practice community.24 It conducted its work over a period of
two years, holding public meetings and receiving comments from
a wide range of sources.25 Eventually, the Task Force issued a
lengthy report, along with numerous recommendations for
actions to be taken to improve the practice of family law in
California.26 Many of the Task Force’s recommendations were
subsequently enacted into law as part of the legislative changes
discussed above including the preference for live testimony in
family law hearings and the changes to the role of minor’s
counsel in child custody proceedings.27 The legislative changes
relating to child testimony in custody cases did not result from
recommendations made by the Task Force, though those changes
were enacted around the same time as the Task Force’s
recommendations were enacted.28
Of course, only time will tell if the aforementioned legislative
changes will be emulated around the country as other
innovations in California family law have been, and whether they
will usher in a broad pendulum swing in family law back in the
direction of traditional modes of adversary litigation. Regardless,
there are reasons to be skeptical of the wisdom of the legislative
changes under discussion here. These reasons relate to both the
process engaged in to arrive at the Elkins Task Force’s
recommendations and the substance of the three legislative
changes discussed here.
First, the Task Force’s recommendations and the subsequent
legislation seem to be overreactions to one particularly bad trial
court decision. Second, the Task Force took what I describe as a
“consumerist” approach to the fact-finding and investigation that
preceded its issuance of its recommendations. The Task Force
23 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., THE ELKINS FAMILY
LAW TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2010), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/elkins-executive.pdf.
24 Id. (“The 38-member task force included appellate court justices, judges, court
commissioners, private attorneys, legal aid attorneys, family law facilitators, self-helpcenter attorneys, court executives, family court managers, family court child custody
mediators, court administrators, and legislative staff.”).
25 Id. at 2.
26 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE ELKINS FAMILY LAW TASK FORCE: FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2010), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/
elkins-finalreport.pdf [hereinafter ELKINS FINAL REPORT].
27 See supra note 4.
28 Ciaran McEvoy, Family Law System Reformed, DAILY JOURNAL, Oct. 29, 2010,
http://www.fmbklaw.com/10daily_journal_family_law.pdf.
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surveyed the opinions of a wide range of the users of family court
services including lawyers, judges, litigants, and court
personnel.29 The Task Force then took great pains to make its
recommendations responsive to the opinions expressed. There is
definitely something laudable about the efforts of a government
entity to be responsive to expressed views of its constituents in
policy-making activities. However, the Task Force may have
taken this notion of “customer satisfaction” a bit too far. Indeed,
there are perspectives other than those of the consumers of court
services that are worthy of consideration in any court reform
effort. In particular, the Task Force seemed to make no effort to
engage academic or other scholarly perspectives that might have
been valuable to consider in making its recommendations. Had
the Task Force considered these perspectives, it would have
encountered a voluminous literature that demonstrates the
ineffectiveness of, and indeed the harms caused by traditional
adversary litigation methods of dispute resolution in family law
disputes, particularly those involving issues of child custody.30
Perhaps the Task Force’s lack of consideration of academic or
scholarly writings regarding effective dispute resolution
procedures in part led to what I consider to be the substantive
failings of the recent legislative changes. For example, the move
toward increased use of live testimony in family law hearings
will do nothing to improve the accuracy and reliability of child
custody decision making, while at the same time unleashing the
harms associated with contested custody litigation, as
demonstrated by the literature mentioned above. Further, the
move toward live testimony in family court hearings seems
inconsistent with caseload and budgetary realities that must be
considered in conjunction with any movement toward family
court reform. This article contends that the Elkins Task Force’s
move toward live testimony is ill advised in light of the Task
Force’s failure to confront these issues.
One of the main forces driving the legislation’s return to live
testimony is the virtual explosion in the number of litigants
representing themselves in family court.31 The Elkins Task
See ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 11.
See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
See Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in
Response to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33
RUTGERS L.J. 105, 105, 110 (2001) [hereinafter Berenson, Family Law] (“[T]he percentage
of cases in which one or both of the parties appears without a lawyer is significantly
higher in family law cases than in any other area of the law.”); Leslie Feitz, Comment, Pro
Se Litigants in Domestic Relations Cases, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 193, 194
(2008) (“[D]epending on the type of proceeding, studies show that in between fifty-five and
eighty percent of domestic relation matters, at least one party appears pro se.”); Jona
29
30
31
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Force and the California Legislature seem convinced that selfrepresented litigants will encounter the same difficulties that
Mr. Elkins did in complying with local rules similar to those that
were in issue in that case, and will be better able to present their
cases through live testimony than under the time-saving
procedures adopted by Contra Costa County and other California
courts. Certainly, though courts have adopted many innovations
to address the challenges created by self-represented litigants,
more work needs to be done to provide adequate access to justice
for such litigants.32 Nonetheless, this article contends that it is
misguided to believe that self-represented litigants will be more
successful as trial practitioners than they are in pre-trial
practice. Moreover, the move to live testimony, at least in the
case of self-represented litigants, will place judges and other
court personnel in unfamiliar and uncomfortable positions, which
may limit the effectiveness of the move in increasing access to
justice.33
This article also questions the legislative changes regarding
the role of minor’s counsel in custody cases. There is a longstanding and unresolved debate regarding whether or not
children should be represented in custody proceedings,34 and if
Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge of
Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 36 (2002) (“The surge in pro se litigation,
particularly in the family courts of every common law country, is reported in official
reports and anecdotally by judges and court managers and in systematic studies.”).
32 See, e.g., Steven Berenson, Homeless Veterans and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q.
173, 180–81 (2011).
33 But cf. Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in
Assisting Pro Se Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City’s Housing Court, 3
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659, 661–62 (2006) (explaining that court rules and
policies, which systematically silence pro se litigants in New York City’s Housing Court,
impede their ability to receive a fair trial); Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including
the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2028–31 (1999) (arguing that judges must be as active as
necessary to ensure that self-represented litigants receive a fair trial because “[i]f the
courts hold out the promise of fairness and justice, but claim for practical reasons to be
unable to achieve such a result, the advertising is false”); Goldschmidt, supra note 31, at
53 (advocating for an expansion of judges’ roles in pro se litigation in order to improve
access to justice).
34 Compare MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 164
(2005) (arguing that appointing counsel for the child in custody cases is misguided most of
the time), with Linda Elrod, Counsel for the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time is Now,
26 FAM. L.Q. 53, 69 (1992) [hereinafter Elrod, Counsel for the Child] (concluding that
children need “court-appointed counsel” and that it is time “to give children a voice in the
legal determinations that so substantially affect their physical and mental well-being”).
By contrast, there is a broad consensus that children should be represented in juvenile
court matters, such as delinquency proceedings, where the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized a right on the part of the child to be represented by counsel. See In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). There is also a broad consensus that children should be
represented in dependency matters, where abuse or neglect of the child is alleged. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a)(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2006) (requiring the appointment of a Guardian Ad
Litem in child protection cases). The focus of this article is exclusively on the question of
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they are represented, what form that representation should
take.35 The traditional approaches are to provide a Guardian Ad
Litem (GAL) for the child, an attorney to represent the child
(minor’s counsel), or both.36 If minor’s counsel is appointed, that
attorney might be charged with advancing the best interests of
the child, or with advancing the child’s expressed preference as to
the outcome of the custody dispute.37 Prior California law did not
provide for the appointment of a GAL in custody proceedings.38
However, California law did provide for appointment of minor’s
counsel,39 and set forth a role for minor’s counsel that was quite
similar to that of a GAL as traditionally understood.40 For
example, minor’s counsel might be required to submit a
statement of issues and contentions that was essentially the
same as a report traditionally submitted by a GAL to the court.41
Further, minor’s counsel was charged with representing the best
interests of the child.42
A consensus has developed among academic commentators
both that it is inappropriate for minor’s counsel to play the
neutral role of a GAL,43 and that best interests representation is
incompatible with attorneys’ proper professional role and the
autonomy interests of children.44 The Elkins legislation satisfies
one of these critiques, by modifying the role of minor’s counsel to
more closely resemble that of an attorney representing an adult
client than that of a GAL.45 However, the relevant statutes, as
representation in custody cases in family court.
35 See Elrod, Counsel for the Child, supra note 34, at 57 (discussing the confusion
over the roles for attorneys in representing children).
36 Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It Is the “Right” Thing to
Do, 27 PACE L. REV. 869, 907–09 (2007) [hereinafter Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers].
37 Id. at 910.
38 See In re Marriage of Lloyd, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
39 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3150 (West 2004), amended by Stats. 2010 ch. 352 § 14 (AB 939)
(effective Jan. 1, 2011).
40 See Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 907–08 (“[A] guardian ad
litem . . . advocates for the best interests of the child by conducting an investigation,
writing reports or otherwise making recommendations . . . .”).
41 FAM. § 3151(b), amended by Stats. 2010 ch. 352 § 15 (AB 939) (effective Jan. 1,
2011); Amy Pellman, Robert Jacobs & Dara K. Reiner, A Child-Centered Response to the
Elkins Family Law Task Force, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 115–16 (2011)
[hereinafter Pellman, A Child-Centered Response].
42 FAM. § 3151(a).
43 See, e.g., ABA, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING CHILDREN
IN CUSTODY CASES § III(b) (2003), reprinted in 37 FAM. L.Q. 131, 131–60 (stating that a
lawyer for a child should not testify, file a report, or make a recommendation as to
custody); Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 908–10.
44 See, e.g., Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Children Who Can’t or Won’t Direct
Counsel: Best Interests Lawyering or No Lawyer at All?, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 382 & n.1
[hereinafter Atwood, Best Interests] (citing numerous articles); Elrod, Client-Directed
Lawyers, supra note 36, at 910–12.
45 FAM. § 3151(b) (West 2011) (eliminating authority of the court to require minor’s
counsel to prepare a statement of issues and contentions, and prohibiting minor’s counsel
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modified, still retain best interests representation by minor’s
counsel.46 The result is something of an incoherent or at least
conflicted role for minor’s counsel in California that also fails to
account adequately for the autonomy interests of older children.
Further, it is argued here that something important is lost in
depriving courts of the neutral and reliable information that
formerly came in the form of minor’s counsels’ statements of
issues and contentions. This article takes the position that a
better solution for the Elkins legislation to have taken would
have been to recognize expressly a GAL role in custody cases, and
further, to modify minor’s counsels’ role to abandon best interests
representation for children old enough to express a mature
preference as to the outcome of the custody case. The interests of
younger children would be protected adequately by a GAL
appointment, or a GAL appointment along with a minor’s counsel
appointed to represent the child.
Lastly, this article also questions the legislation increasing
the use of child testimony in custody cases.47 There is an
overwhelming consensus among child psychologists that heavy
involvement by children in their parents’ custody disputes puts
the children at serious risk of psychological harm.48 Yet there is
no activity that puts children squarely in the cross-hairs of their
parents’ dispute to the degree that testifying in open court, and
being subject to cross-examination does. Prior law gave judges
ample authority to allow children to testify in court, when it was
necessary and important to do so.49 However, prior law’s
preference for using alternative means to take children’s views
into account in custody cases was more in line with children’s
best psychological interests than the amended statute’s move
toward child testimony. Indeed, this change, along with the
previously mentioned changes that will increase the adversarial
aspect of child custody proceedings, will serve primarily to
exacerbate the necessary harm caused to children by being the
subject of contested custody proceedings.

from testifying as a witness in custody proceedings); Pellman, A Child-Centered Response,
supra note 41, at 115–16.
46 FAM. § 3151(a).
47 Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, supra note 41, at 115.
48 See, e.g., ROBERT E. EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN’S ADJUSTMENT 20
(2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE] (“Many negative consequences of
divorce for children in the United States today could be avoided if family, social, and
economic disruptions could be minimized.”).
49 See FAM. § 3042 (West 2004), amended by Stats. 2010 ch. 187 § 1 (AB 1050)
(effective Jan. 1, 2012).
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The article proceeds as follows. First, the article engages in
a more detailed description of the Elkins case and decision.50
Next, the article describes the work of the Elkins Task Force,51
and the legislation that followed the Task Force’s Report.52 The
article then engages in a critique of the Elkins family law
changes.53 It begins at a general level,54 first characterizing the
changes as an overreaction to one particularly bad judicial
decision,55 second, questioning the process utilized by the Task
Force to arrive at its recommendations,56 and third, questioning
the legislation’s turn away from the trend against adversary
litigation as the primary means of resolving family law
disputes.57 The article then proceeds to offer a more specific
critique of the three aspects of the recent California family law
changes that are the focus here,58 the preference for live
testimony in family law hearings,59 the revisions to the role of
minor’s counsel in custody cases,60 and the increased likelihood of
child testimony in custody disputes.61 The article concludes by
offering a revised set of recommendations that would accomplish
many of the goals set forth by the Elkins Task Force, but without
imposing the negative consequences of the changes that have
actually been adopted.62
I. THE ELKINS DECISION
Marilyn Elkins filed for dissolution of her more than twodecade marriage to Jeffrey Elkins.63 The financial issues were
scheduled to be tried on September 19, 2005.64 Pursuant to a
local rule of the Contra Costa County (California) Superior Court,
the matter was to be decided based upon “the pleadings
submitted by the parties without live testimony.”65 The rule
further provided that “direct examination on factual matters
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV(A).
See infra Part IV(A)(i).
See infra Part IV(A)(ii).
See infra Part IV(A)(iii).
See infra Part IV(B).
See infra Part IV(B)(i).
See infra Part IV(B)(ii).
See infra Part IV(B)(iii).
62 See infra Part V.
63 Respondent’s Return by Answer to Petition for Writ of Mandate or Prohibition at
11 Elkins v. Superior Court, 163 P.3d 160 (Cal. 2007) (No. S139073), 2006 WL 1267810.
The parties were married in 1980 and separated in 2001. Id.
64 Elkins, 163 P.3d at 162.
65 Id. at 163 (quoting SUP. CT. CONTRA COSTA CNTY. R. 12.5(b)(3) (effective July 1,
2005) (repealed 2008)).
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
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shall not be permitted except in unusual circumstances or for
proper rebuttal.”66 The parties’ declarations would be admitted
in evidence at the hearing, “subject to legal objection,
amendment, and cross-examination . . . .”67
A local trial
scheduling order (TSO) further restricted the parties’ ability to
submit evidence at the hearing.68 The TSO reiterated that direct
testimony would be presented at trial in the form of declarations
submitted prior to trial “in lieu of oral direct testimony, subject to
cross-examination.”69 Declarations from the parties and their
witnesses were required to be filed ten court days prior to trial,
along with trial briefs.70 The TSO further provided that all trial
exhibits needed to be appended to the declarations and that the
evidentiary basis for the admissibility of the exhibits needed to
be set forth in the declarations as well.71
Marilyn was represented by counsel for purposes of the
hearing, but Jeffrey was not.72 Both parties submitted their trial
briefs and declarations on September 2, 2005.73 Jeffrey, however,
did not attach his exhibits to his declaration as required by the
TSO, but rather delivered a binder with thirty-six exhibits to the
court and opposing counsel one court day prior to the hearing.74
Marilyn filed a responsive declaration on September 8, 2005.75
At the hearing, Marilyn’s attorney objected to the introduction of
all but two of Jeffrey’s exhibits on grounds that only those two
exhibits were described in his declaration as required by the
TSO.76 The court ultimately sustained counsel’s objection to the
introduction of the exhibits.77 After a lengthy colloquy with the
court regarding its reasons for disallowing the exhibits, Jeffrey
also declined to offer his declaration in evidence.78 With no
evidence from Jeffrey to consider, the matter proceeded “quasi by
default, so to speak,” in the words of the trial judge.79 Though
66 Id. (quoting SUP. CT. CONTRA COSTA CNTY. R. 12.5(b)(3) (effective July 1, 2005)
(repealed 2008)).
67 Id. (quoting SUP. CT. CONTRA COSTA CNTY. R. 12.5(b)(3) (effective July 1, 2005)
(repealed 2008)).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. The TSO required these documents to be filed ten court days before the
hearing. Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. The TSO required responsive declarations and exhibits to be filed five court
days before the hearing. Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 164. The TSO did provide that “[f]ailure to comply with [its] requirements
will constitute good cause to exclude evidence or testimony at trial . . . .” Id. at 163.
78 Id. at 164.
79 Id.
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the judge awarded Jeffrey an interest in the marital home and in
Marilyn’s pension, the court resolved the other property issues in
a manner substantially in conformity with the proposed order
submitted by Marilyn’s counsel.80
Jeffrey appealed the judgment of the trial court, arguing that
there was no statutory authority for the local requirements
preventing direct testimony at the hearing, requiring
declarations to be filed, and requiring the evidentiary foundation
for trial exhibits to be set forth in the declarations.81 He also
contended that the system of “trial by declaration” deprived him
of his due process right to a hearing on the merits of his claim,
and that the sanctions available for violation of the local rule and
TSO were inconsistent with policies favoring resolution on the
merits of disputes.82 California’s intermediate appellate court
summarily denied Jeffrey’s petition.83 However, the California
Supreme Court granted Jeffrey’s petition for review, and ordered
the Contra Costa County Superior Court to show cause why the
local rule and order should not be deemed invalid for the reasons
argued by Jeffrey before the intermediate appellate court.84
The California Supreme Court noted that while “some
informality and flexibility have been accepted in marital
dissolution proceedings,” the same statutory rules of evidence
and procedure that govern other civil matters remain applicable
in the family court.85 Additionally, declarations of the sort
required by Contra Costa County are hearsay, and therefore are
inadmissible at trial, unless an exception to the hearsay rule
provides for their admission.86 One such exception appears in
section 2009 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which
provides for the admissibility of affidavits or declarations in
motion proceedings.87 However, the court made clear that section
2009 did not support the Contra Costa County rule because that
rule applied at trial, rather than in motion proceedings.88

Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 167–68.
Id. at 168.
87 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2009 (West 2007) (“An affidavit may be used to verify a
pleading or a paper in a special proceeding, to prove the service of a summons, notice, or
other paper in an action or special proceeding, to obtain a provisional remedy, the
examination of a witness, or a stay of proceedings, and in uncontested proceedings to
establish a record of birth, or upon a motion, and in any other case expressly permitted by
statute.”); see also Elkins, 163 P.3d at 168.
88 Elkins, 163 P.3d at 168.
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
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The court went on to discuss the policy in favor of the
admissibility of all relevant evidence, that evidence relating to
the credibility of other evidence falls within the scope of such
relevant evidence, and that live testimony may be particularly
important to determining the credibility of witnesses and other
evidence presented in marital dissolution and other trials.89 The
court offered numerous examples of statutory and case law
support for this proposition, and therefore was able to conclude
that the lower court’s rules contravened these authorities and
were invalid, without having to reach Jeffrey’s due process
arguments.90
The primary justification offered by the County in support of
its rules focused on “efficiency” and the desire to provide for the
“expeditious resolution of family law cases . . . .”91 The California
Supreme Court praised the County’s desire to provide efficient
procedures and to move cases quickly through the system.92 It
also acknowledged the particularly heavy volume of marital
dissolution cases required to be handled by superior courts, and
the additional challenges presented by the fact that such a high
percentage of litigants in such cases appear without counsel.93
Nonetheless, the court concluded that these interests cannot
trump the rights of litigants to “fair and accessible justice.”94
Given that trial courts all around the state face similar
challenges to those faced by Contra Costa County, and many
courts have adopted similar rules and procedures to those that
the high court struck down as impermissible, the court concluded
by recommending to the Judicial Council95 that
Id. at 170.
Id. at 169–70.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 176.
Created by a state constitutional amendment in 1926, the California Judicial
Council is the governing body of California’s judicial branch, administering the extremely
large California Court system. See Ronald M. George, Brennan Lecture: Challenges
Facing an Independent Judiciary, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1345, 1353 & n.24 (2005); ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, PROFILE: JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA 1 (4th ed. 2006),
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/profilejc.pdf. According to article VI of the
California Constitution:
The Judicial Council consists of the Chief Justice and one other judge of the
Supreme Court, three judges of courts of appeal, 10 judges of superior courts,
two nonvoting court administrators, and any other nonvoting members as
determined by the voting membership of the council, each appointed by the
Chief Justice for a three-year term pursuant to procedures established by the
council; four members of the State Bar appointed by its governing body for
three-year terms; and one member of each house of the Legislature appointed
as provided by the house.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6(a).
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
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it establish a task force, including representatives of the family law
bench and bar and the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on
Family and Juvenile Law, to study and propose measures to assist
trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital dissolution
proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of
whom are self-represented. Such a task force might wish to consider
proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing statewide
rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in
family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions.
Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented
litigants. Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for
laypersons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a
litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her
case to the court.96

II. THE ELKINS FAMILY LAW TASK FORCE
Pursuant to the recommendation of the California Supreme
Court, the Judicial Council appointed the Elkins Family Law
Task Force in 2008.97 The Task Force consisted of thirty-eight
members, including “appellate court justices, judges, court
commissioners, private attorneys, legal aid attorneys, family law
facilitators, self-help-center attorneys, court executives, family
court managers, family court child custody mediators, court
administrators, and legislative staff.”98 The Task Force worked
for nearly two years in formulating its recommendations.99 It
sought input from a variety of sources including: focus groups
with court users, attorneys, judicial officers and court staff;
comments at public meetings and one public hearing; and
numerous e-mail and print letters commenting on the work of the
commission.100 The Task Force also conducted a survey of
attorneys, and reviewed available court data.101 In September
2009 the Task Force released a set of draft recommendations.102
The Task Force then held additional public hearings and sought
additional input regarding the draft recommendations before
finalizing its recommendations in an April 2010 report.103
The Task Force made recommendations in five broad areas.
These areas were: (1) efficient and effective procedures to help
Elkins, 163 P.3d at 178 n.20.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE ELKINS FAMILY LAW TASK FORCE FINAL
REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2010), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/
elkins-executive.pdf.
98 Id.
99 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 11.
100 Id.
101 See Laurie Zelon, The Elkins Task Force: Meeting the Challenges of Family Law in
California’s Courts, 1 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 25, 27 (2010).
102 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 14.
103 Id.
96
97
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ensure justice, fairness, due process and safety;104 (2) more
effective child custody procedures;105 (3) ensuring meaningful
access to justice for all litigants;106 (4) enhancing the status of,
and respect for, family law litigants and processes;107 and (5)
laying the foundation for future innovation.108 In total, the Task
Force offered 117 separate recommendations.109
Naturally,
discussing each of the recommendations goes well beyond the
scope of the present analysis.
Moreover, many of the
recommendations are laudable.
For example, the report
recommends: the adoption of caseflow management procedures
for family law cases similar to those that have been successfully
implemented regarding other civil cases;110 better information for
litigants regarding court processes and procedures;111 providing
increased assistance to those who seek to settle their family law
disputes;112 simplification of mandatory court forms;113 greater
availability of interpreters for those who do not speak English
adequately to participate effectively in court proceedings;114 and
greater accessibility of court facilities for persons with
disabilities.115 Thus, the focus here will be on the task force’s
more controversial recommendations.
These include a
presumption in favor of live testimony at all family law
hearings116 and a new definition of the role of minors’ counsel to
more closely approximate the traditional understanding of an
attorney
representing
a
client.117
Further,
those
recommendations that subsequently led to legislative changes
are the most significant for purposes of the present analysis.
III. THE ELKINS FAMILY LAW LEGISLATION
Unlike
many
“blue-ribbon”
task
forces
whose
recommendations quickly end up in the dust-bin of policy
analysis,118 the Elkins Task Force’s recommendations led quickly

Id. at 19.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 88.
Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, supra note 41, at 83.
ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 21.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 33–36.
114 Id. at 69.
115 Id. at 73.
116 Id. at 29.
117 Id. at 53–54.
118 For example, in 2010, President Obama created the National Commission on
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, also known as the Simpson-Bowles Commission, after
its co-chairmen, former Senator Alan Simpson (Republican) and former White House
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Do Not Delete

2012]

2/1/2012 2:10 PM

The Elkins Legislation

457

to significant legislative changes to California family law. The
two major pieces of legislation were California Assembly Bills
939 and 1050.119 The highlights of this legislation will be
addressed below.
First and foremost, California Assembly Bill 939 added to
the California Family Code section 217, which provides that:
(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion
brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a
finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall
receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the
scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.
(b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to
refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the
finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by
January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors
a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.[120]
(c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other
than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness
list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony. If the
witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on
request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate
temporary orders pending the continued hearing.121

Chief-of-Staff Erskine Bowles (Democrat). See About the National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform, NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM,
www.fiscalcommission.gov/about (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). The Commission was
charged with “identifying policies to improve the fiscal situation in the medium term and
to achieve fiscal sustainability over the long run.” Id. Despite issuing a very well received
report, the Commission’s recommendations have not been implemented. See Op-Ed, Let’s
Take Another Look at Simpson-Bowles, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 16, 2011,
http://www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/Let-s-take-another-look-at-SimpsonBowles-2273167.php; Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed, Go Big, Mr. Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2011, at A31.
119 Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, supra note 41, at 83.
120 The factors set forth in Rule 5.119(b) of the California Rules of Court are:
1) [w]hether a substantive matter is at issue—such as child custody, parenting
time (visitation), parentage, child support, spousal support, requests for
restraining orders, or the characterization, division, or temporary use and
control of the property or debt of the parties;
2) [w]hether material facts are in controversy;
3) [w]hether live testimony is necessary for the court to assess the credibility
of parties or other witnesses;
4) [t]he right of the parties to question anyone submitting reports or other
information to the court;
5) [i]n testimony from persons other than the parties, whether there has been
compliance with Family Code section 217(c); and
6) [a]ny other factor that is just and equitable.
CAL. R. CT. 5.119(b).
121 CAL. FAM. CODE § 217 (West 2011) (emphasis added).
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Assembly Bill 939 also contained a number of provisions
relating to the award of attorney’s fees in family law cases.122
The Bill also had provisions expanding the availability of the
summary dissolution process.123 Further, it redefined the role of
minor’s counsel in contested custody cases to more closely
approximate the traditional understanding of the role of an
attorney representing a client in litigation.124 Thus, minor’s
counsel is restricted to presenting admissible evidence to the
court, in the form of “notices and pleadings . . . consistent with
requirements for parties.”125 Minor’s counsel is not to testify as a
witness in the proceedings.126 Minor’s counsel is required to
present the child’s wishes to the court if the child so desires.127
“Counsel may introduce and examine counsel’s own witnesses,
present arguments to the court concerning the child’s welfare,
and participate further in the proceeding to the degree necessary
to represent the child adequately.”128
Under California law, mediation is mandatory in child
custody disputes.129 Moreover, at the election of each county, the
county may allow the family court mediator to make a
recommendation to the court regarding the custody dispute.130
Under the Elkins legislation, in counties that have opted for this
evaluative mediation, the family court services mediator will now
be known as the “child custody recommending counselor.”131
The other major piece of family law legislation enacted
following the Elkins Task Force Report was Assembly Bill
1050.132
However, AB 1050 was not the result of
recommendations made by the task force. Still, consistent with
the Elkins changes, AB 1050 expands the role of child testimony
in custody disputes.133
Thus, AB 1050 amends existing
California family law to require judges to allow a child, age
fourteen or higher, to address the court on the issues of custody
and visitation, unless the court determines that doing so would
not be in the child’s best interests.134 Moreover, the revised
statute further states that nothing in the law “shall be
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Assemb. B. 939, 2009–2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess., §§ 4–6, 13, 17 (Cal. 2010).
Assemb. B. 939, §§ 8–9.
Assemb. B. 939, § 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170(a) (West 2011).
FAM. § 3183.
2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1916, 1924 (West) (to be codified at FAM. § 3183).
Assemb. B. 1050, 2009–2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Cal. 2010).
Assemb. B. 1050 § 1.
Assemb. B. 1050, § 1 (enacted at FAM. § 3042 (West 2011)).
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interpreted to prevent a child who is less than 14 years of age
from addressing the court regarding custody or visitation . . . .”135
IV. WHY MANY OF THE ELKINS FAMILY LAW CHANGES
ARE MISGUIDED
This part of the article outlines some of the many reasons
why the Elkins family law changes under consideration here are
misguided. It first addresses some general criticisms of the
changes, then the three specific statutory changes that are the
focus here.
A. General Criticisms of the Elkins Family Law Changes
There are at least three general criticisms of the Elkins
family law changes. First, they represent an overreaction to a
particularly bad decision in a single case.
Second, the
information gathering processes relied upon by the Elkins Task
Force in making its recommendations were lacking in important
respects. Third, the changes make an ill-advised reversal of
course from the strong trend in family law in recent decades
away from adversary litigation.
i. Bad Decisions Make Bad Law
One of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous aphorisms is
that hard cases make bad law.136 Well, bad decisions make bad
law as well, and it is quite clear that Judge Baskin made a bad
decision in essentially depriving Jeffrey Elkins of any meaningful
opportunity to be heard regarding his divorce trial.137 However,
the changes recommended by the Task Force and adopted by the
Legislature go far beyond what would have been required to
remedy the injustice caused in the Elkins case.
First, as the California Supreme Court’s decision makes
abundantly clear, the Elkins appeal involved a trial rather than a
mere motion hearing.138
And of course, the due process
implications of restricting testimony at the final hearing in a
proceeding are much more significant than for doing so at a
preliminary hearing. Indeed, the court expressly stated that its
decision should not be read as applying to motion hearings rather

FAM. § 3042(d).
See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Unfortunately, Mr. Elkins was not able to benefit from the remand ordered by the
California Supreme Court in his case. He died in 2008 before the case could be tried.
Barbara Kate Repa, Reform or Wreckage, CAL. LAW., Aug. 2011, at 26, 30 [hereinafter
Repa, Reform or Wreckage].
138 Elkins v. Superior Court, 163 P.3d. 160, 168–69 (Cal. 2007).
135
136
137
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than trials.139 Yet, the Task Force and subsequent legislation
went well beyond the scope of what the court intended by
extending the requirement for live testimony to motion hearings
as well as to trials.
The Task Force rightly recognized that the results of motion
hearings in family law cases may have a greater impact on the
outcome of proceedings than in other areas of practice.140
Particularly where custody of a child is concerned, a court will be
highly reluctant to disturb the results of a pendente lite motion
where the effect will be changing the custodial arrangement of a
minor child.141 Such disruptions can be highly detrimental to
children, and courts’ reluctance to change custody back and forth
between parents over the course of family law litigation makes
sense.142 Thus, it is arguable that decisions in motion hearings in
family court set something of a status quo that courts are
reluctant to disturb; therefore, the importance of such pre-trial
motions is elevated, and the drawbacks of requiring live
testimony at such hearings are nonetheless warranted.
However, it is clear that regardless of the import of pre-trial
hearings in family law cases, litigants still get a final (and indeed
their most extensive) “bite at the apple,” should they choose to
exercise their right to a final trial on the contested custody issues
in the case. Preserving a right to present live testimony at such
a final hearing would address the due process concerns the
California Supreme Court raised in Elkins, while at the same
time failing to unleash all of the negative consequences,
discussed below, that will accompany increased use of live
testimony in pre-trial motion hearings in family law cases. Thus,
the Task Force and the Legislature should have stopped at the
court’s call for increased use of live testimony at trials, rather
than greatly expanding the scope of the court’s suggestion.

Id. at 162 n.1.
ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 27–28.
See, e.g., Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of
Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 112–13 (1997) (describing
this phenomenon as “sequentiality”).
142 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 478–79 (Cal. 1996) (“[T]he
paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements—and the harm that
may result from disruption of established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the
primary caretaker—weigh heavily in favor of maintaining ongoing custody
arrangements.”).
139
140
141
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ii. The Information Gathering Processes Used by the Elkins
Task Force Were Flawed
It is true that the Elkins Task Force included a broad crosssection of judges, court personnel, and family law practitioners.143
However, notably absent from the Task Force were any
academics. And while the Task Force purports to have examined
data available from the California Administrative Office of the
Courts regarding the practice of family law in California,144 there
is no indication that the Task Force paid any attention
whatsoever to the vast amount of existing scholarly research and
literature regarding adversary justice generally and family law
litigation in particular. An analysis of that literature reveals a
profound skepticism regarding the efficacy of the adversary
processes that the Elkins legislation reintroduces into family law
practice, and a particular concern about the damage caused to
the participants in family law disputes from the employment of
adversary processes to resolve such disputes.145
Additionally, the Elkins Task Force displayed a
“consumerist” approach to its fact-finding and analysis regarding
the pre-existing family law dispute resolution processes. The
Task Force, prior to issuing its recommendations, surveyed a
broad range of “consumers” of the services of the family law
department during its fact-finding inquiry.146 These consumers
included lawyers, litigants, court personnel, and judges.
Moreover, it is clear that, in issuing its recommendations, the
Task Force took great pains to respond to the concerns expressed
by these consumers of its services.
Indeed, the Task
Force’s Final Report frequently states where a particular
recommendation is responsive to a comment or comments made
by one of its consumers.147
Of course it is laudatory when a government entity such as a
court seeks to assert a high level of responsiveness to the
constituents it exists to serve. More government entities should
seek to emulate the customer service orientation of the task
force. However, it is also possible to take this customer service
orientation too far. For example, the consumers of judicial
143 See ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at ii–iii (listing the members of the
Elkins Task Force).
144 Id. at 14 n.7.
145 See infra notes 148–56 and accompanying text.
146 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 11–14.
147 See, e.g., ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 28 (“According to the surveys
conducted and the response of the members of the public who presented testimony to the
task force, these limitations on the right to present live testimony and the resulting
exclusive use of declarations are significant concerns to attorneys and the self-represented
alike.”).
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services are unlikely to be experts in important matters such as
court administration and substantive family law, let alone
broader concepts like due process. And, as pointed out above, the
task force seems to have paid little attention to scholarly writing,
academic experts, or broader empirical studies regarding the
effectiveness of various approaches to dispute resolution in
family courts.
While the Task Force’s customer service
orientation is commendable, that orientation would have been
more effective coupled with the consideration of the broader
range of important information suggested here that the task
force should have, but failed, to consider.
iii. The Paradigm Shift Away from Adversary Litigation
Over the past four decades, many family law scholars have
concluded that traditional adversary litigation measures are
poorly suited to resolving family law disputes, particularly those
involving children.148 Family law disputes differ significantly
from the typical tort, contract, and property disputes that our
adversary system was designed to address. Litigation involving
most disputes in these other areas of law is “backward looking”:
courts must determine what happened with regard to a past
event or events, and assign blame for what went wrong.149 By
contrast, while custody cases do involve a certain measure of fact
finding with regard to past events, the ultimate goal of such
proceedings is to make a prediction regarding future
possibilities—for example, which potential custody arrangement
will serve the best interests of the child.150 Yet adversarial
litigation methods were not designed to predict the future, but
rather to assess and assign a remedy regarding past events, and
they do a poor job in making such future predictions.151
By its very nature, the adversary system encourages
litigants to assert extreme positions.
Indeed, one of the
148 See, e.g., Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System to Protect Children in High
Conflict Custody Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 495, 501 (2001) [hereinafter Elrod,
High Conflict]; Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best Interests of Children: A
Proposal To Transform the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 203, 203 (2004);
Murphy, supra note 5, at 894; Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Custody
Disputes: From Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 395, 428 (2000) [hereinafter Schepard, Evolving Judicial Role];
Singer, supra note 6, at 363; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 82.
149 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 501; SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra
note 6, at 3; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 98.
150 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 501; SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra
note 6, at 3; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 98.
151 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 501; Firestone & Weinstein, supra note
148, at 205; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 111 (“Decisions about the best interests of the
child rest upon an effort to predict what will occur in the future . . . [and] [c]learly, neither
judges nor attorneys have the training to make such predictions . . . .”).
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foundational premises of the adversary system is that truth is
most likely to emerge from the presentation of competing and
contrasting positions.152 The presentation of competing extremes
is often enhanced by the zealous advocacy responsibilities of the
parties’ lawyers.153 Naturally, this process can create additional
friction between the parties to the dispute, who would not be
suing one another in the first place if their relationship were not
already strained. However, in tort, contract, and property
contexts, the increased friction is tolerable because, once the
lawsuit is over and the dispute resolved, the parties go their
separate ways.154 Yet, this is not so in most family law contexts,
particularly not in custody litigation. Except in unusual cases,
both parents will continue to play a major role in their child’s life,
and they will need to co-parent successfully, often for many years
into the future, in order to serve the best interests of the child.
Yet, the strains engendered by hotly contested custody litigation
may have a highly negative impact on the parents’ ability to
work together in future co-parenting.155
The tendency to assert extreme positions takes place at
every stage of the adversarial litigation process.156 In their
pleadings, the parties advance the most extreme positions
possible, if only to keep their options open later in the case.
Indeed, the “all or nothing” quality of litigation judgments
requires parties to ask for everything, or risk receiving nothing
at the end of the case.157 In a typical custody case, parents
exaggerate their own parenting strengths, as well as the other
parent’s weaknesses, in an effort to enhance their position in the
litigation. This process of exaggeration continues at every
further stage of the litigation process:158 in discovery events such
as depositions, interrogatories, and document requests; in
settlement negotiations; and, of course, reaches its apogee during
152 See, e.g., Cantrell, supra note 7, at 6; Judge Leonard Edwards (ret.), Comments on
the Miller Commission Report: A California Perspective, 27 PACE L. REV. 627, 635 (2007)
[hereinafter, Edwards, Comments]; Firestone & Weinstein, supra note 148, at 203.
153 See, e.g., Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 501; Firestone & Weinstein,
supra note 148, at 204; Andrew Schepard, Kramer vs. Kramer Revisited: A Comment on
The Miller Commission Report and the Obligation of Divorce Lawyers for Parents to
Discuss Alternative Dispute Resolution with Their Clients, 27 PACE L. REV. 677, 685–86
(2007) [hereinafter, Schepard, Kramer]; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 90–91.
154 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 501.
155 See Firestone & Weinstein, supra note 148, at 204; Weinstein, supra note 141, at
122.
156 See, e.g., Edwards, Comments, supra note 152, at 636 (describing adversarial
tactics in an at-fault divorce proceeding).
157 Weinstein, supra note 141, at 87–88.
158 Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions for Parents and Children in
Custody and Access Disputes: Current Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
129, 131 (2002).
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the contested courtroom hearing or trial.159 The likelihood of
increased hostility between the parties at every stage of the
process as a result of this competition is obvious.160
Over the past four decades, psychologists and other
researchers have developed a more sophisticated understanding
of the impact that divorce and child custody litigation has on the
children involved. At the beginning of this cycle, researchers
held the perception that in virtually all cases, divorce had a
significantly negative psychological impact on children.161
However, over time, psychologists have come to conclude that not
all children suffer long-term harm as a result of divorce.162
Indeed, the pivotal factor in determining children’s long-term
adjustment to family dissolution relates to the amount of intrafamily conflict to which the children are exposed.163 This
exposure can occur within the family home prior to the break-up
of the family, or during the divorce/custody litigation, or postlitigation as the parents struggle to co-parent the child after the
marriage has been dissolved.164 In virtually all cases, increases
in the amount of intra-family conflict result in increased negative
outcomes for the children as they age.165 Thus, adversary
litigation events that increase the amount of conflict between
parents during the litigation process, and then have a negative
impact on the on-going, post-dissolution relationship of the
parents, will logically result in adverse consequences to the
children involved.
In recognition of these findings by both legal scholars and
psychologists, courts have taken significant steps to modify
traditional adversary processes in family law by moving from
those procedures that engender conflict between the litigants to
newer and emerging processes designed to decrease conflict
between the litigants. Perhaps the most widespread and best
known of such changes is the move toward mediation of family

See infra Part IV(B)(i).
See Edwards, Comments, supra note 152, at 637.
See Paul R. Amato, Good Enough Marriages: Parental Discord, Divorce, and
Children’s Long-Term Well-Being, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 71, 72 (2001); Cassandra
Brown, Comment, Ameliorating the Effects of Divorce on Children, 22 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 461, 461 (2009); SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 28.
162 Amato, supra note 161, at 71–72; Elizabeth S. Scott, Divorce, Children’s Welfare,
and the Culture Wars, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 95, 100 (2001).
163 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 161, at 462; Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at
497; John H. Grych, Interparental Conflict as a Risk Factor for Child Maladjustment:
Implications for the Development of Prevention Programs, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 97, 98 (2005);
Kelly, supra note 158, at 129–30; Murphy, supra note 6, at 894–95; SCHEPARD, CHILDREN,
COURTS, supra note 6, at 31; Scott, supra note 162, at 98–99; Singer, supra note 6, at 363.
164 Brown, supra note 161, at 462.
165 See Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 497.
159
160
161
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law disputes, as discussed above.166 Mediation is meant to
encourage parties to resolve their differences rather than to
engage in protracted courtroom battles.167 Other examples of
procedures developed in family court to reduce litigation conflict
include: differentiated case management,168 parenting plans,169
parent education classes,170 parenting coordinators,171 neutral
custody evaluations,172 and collaborative law.173 A detailed
discussion of these procedures lies well beyond the scope of the
present article. Though not each of these reforms has been
adopted in every jurisdiction, the overall move toward the
adoption of non-adversarial methods to help to resolve family law
disputes has been widespread, national, and overwhelming in
scope. And, as pointed out earlier, California has been a leader
in the adoption of such methods in many respects.174
Certainly, the Elkins changes represent a 180-degree turn
from this long-standing trend away from adversarial litigation
methods in family law cases. As the Elkins Task Force pointed
out, in many courts the presentation of live testimony had
become the exception, rather than the rule, in contested family
law proceedings, particularly in motion proceedings rather than
trials.175 Yet, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the
presentation of live testimony through witnesses in court
represents the most adversarial of all possible litigation
activities.176 The legislation also redefines the role of minor’s
counsel more along the lines of the traditional adversarial
attorney, rather than the guardian ad litem-like role minor’s
See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
See Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 527 & n.124; Schepard, Kramer, supra
note 153, at 682 (discussing benefits of mediation in custody disputes); Nancy Ver Steegh,
Family Court Reform and ADR: Shifting Values and Expectations Transform the Divorce
Process, 42 FAM. L.Q. 659, 662 (2008).
168 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 521–22; Ver Steegh, supra note 167, at
668–69.
169 Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at 529–30.
170 Grych, supra note 163, at 103; Shelley Kierstead, Parent Education Programs in
Family Courts: Balancing Autonomy and State Intervention, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 140, 140
(2011); Susan L. Pollet & Melissa Lombreglia, A Nationwide Survey of Mandatory Parent
Education, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 375, 375 (2008).
171 See Brown, supra note 161, at 477–78; Elrod, High Conflict, supra note 148, at
533; Joi T. Montiel, Why and How Alabama Courts Should Use Parenting Coordination in
Divorce Cases, 72 ALA. LAW. 300, 301 (2011); Ver Steegh, supra note 167, at 663–64.
172 Mary Kay Kisthardt & Barbara Glesner Fines, Making a Place at the Table:
Reconceptualizing the Role of the Custody Evaluator in Child Custody Disputes, 43 FAM.
CT. REV. 229, 229–30 (2005); Ver Steegh, supra note 167, at 663.
173 See Brown, supra note 161, at 479–80; Ver Steegh, supra note 167, at 667–68.
174 SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 83–84 (comparing the dissolution
process in New York with that of California); Schepard, Evolving Judicial Role, supra
note 148, at 397–98.
175 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 27.
176 See infra Part IV(B)(i).
166
167
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counsel had come to play in family law cases in California.177
This too will have the effect of increasing the adversarial nature
of custody litigation. Finally, the legislative changes making it
more likely that children will testify or otherwise play an active
role in family law litigation will also serve to further increase the
adversarial quality of such proceedings.178
To be sure, the Elkins legislation does not represent a
wholesale abandonment of collaborative procedures in California
family law practice. After all, California was the first state to
mandate mediation in child custody disputes,179 and such
mediation remains required under California law. However,
some of the Elkins changes do suggest that California’s
commitment to non-adversary procedures is less steadfast than
its first-to-mandate mediation status would appear to indicate.
From early on, California counties have had the option to decide
whether, in the event the parties are not able to reach an
agreement as to the custody issues in their case, the mediator
should make a recommendation to the court as to how the
custody dispute should be resolved.180 This practice has long
been criticized by mediation scholars as violating some of the
fundamental principles of mediation including confidentiality
and neutrality.181 Indeed, many would consider a “mediator’s
recommendation” to be an oxymoron.
While this author shares the criticisms of the manner in
which mediation is conducted in “recommending” counties, those
arguments have been fully aired elsewhere, and will not be
repeated here.182 The Elkins Task Force noted, but sidestepped
the controversy surrounding mediator recommendations and
made none of its own recommendations on the subject.183
However, the Task Force did note that many family law litigants
expressed frustration and surprise at the fact that what they
presumed was a confidential process (mediation), was anything
but, when they found their statements to the mediator quoted
and provided directly to the judge in the case in the form of the
See infra Part IV(B)(ii).
See infra Part IV(B)(iii).
See Grillo, supra note 2, at 1552.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3183 (West 2004).
See, e.g., Edwards, Comments, supra note 152, at 649; Susan C. Kuhn, Comment,
Mandatory Mediation: California Civil Code Section 4107, 33 EMORY L.J. 733, 776 (1984);
Angel Lawrence, Capitulate or Else: San Diego’s Mandatory Mediation Process and
Procedural Fairness, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 247, 251 (2007); see also Robert
Rubinson, Mapping the World: Facts and Meaning in Adjudication and Mediation, 63 ME.
L. REV. 61, 64 n.16 (2010) (illustrating the current debate over which style of mediation is
best).
182 See Kuhn, supra note 181, at 777.
183 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 45.
177
178
179
180
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mediator’s recommendation.184 As a result, the Elkins legislation
did adopt a change in nomenclature, so that mediators in
“recommending” counties will no longer be referred to as
mediators, but rather will be referred to as “child custody
recommending counselors.”185 This change further reflects the
Elkins legislation’s movement away from non-adversary
procedures.
One family law scholar, at least at first glance, seems to
support Elkins’ move away from less adversarial processes in
family law litigation. In an important article, Professor Jane
Murphy argues that the adversary system needs to be revitalized
in the case of family law.186 Murphy is also referring to the
“paradigm shift” discussed above in which the focus of family law
dispute resolution has moved from the courtroom to settings such
as the psychologist’s office, the mediation conference room, etc.
However, Murphy’s critique is not about the different approaches
within the adversarial system that might be used to adjudicate
family law disputes, such as live testimony versus written
declarations, what role minor’s counsel should play, and child
testimony versus other means of giving children a voice in
custody disputes. Rather, her critique focuses on whether courts
have the institutional competence to provide the extra-judicial
processes of the therapeutic regime that has replaced the
adversarial one,187 and whether these processes adequately
protect the due process rights of family law litigants, particularly
poor ones.188 The Elkins legislation does not, in fact, move away,
in a fundamental fashion, from the types of extra-judicial process
that concern Professor Murphy. Indeed, the Elkins legislation
includes provisions for family centered case management,
independent evaluation, and mediation of family law disputes. It
will remain the case that the vast majority of California family
law cases will settle before trial. Thus, Professor Murphy’s
critique does not provide support for the specific Elkins changes
that are the focus of the present discussion.
B. Specific Criticisms of the Elkins Family Law Changes
This section of the article offers more particular criticisms of
three specific legislative changes ushered in by the Elkins Report
and its aftermath. The move to live testimony in family law
motion hearings, the changes to the role of minor’s counsel in
184
185
186
187
188

Id.
FAM. § 3183(a).
Murphy, supra note 6, at 891–92.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 910.
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custody proceedings, and the increased reliance on child
testimony in such proceedings will each be addressed.
i. The Presumption in Favor of Live Testimony in Motion
Hearings
The increased reliance on live testimony in motion hearings
in family law cases is the single most misguided aspect of the
Elkins legislation. This change will do little if anything to
increase the accuracy and reliability of judicial decision making
in such proceedings. Yet the costs to litigants as a result of the
increased adversarial nature that will be engendered by the
increased use of live testimony will be significant. In an era of
severe budgetary constraints for California courts, the increased
use of live testimony will have a significant negative impact on
both litigants and the court system itself in terms of increased
delays and other costs in family law cases. Further, the primary
purpose behind the increased use of live testimony, to increase
fairness to self-represented litigants, will not be realized by the
Elkins changes.
a. The Benefits of Live Testimony Do Not Outweigh the
Costs of Increased Adversarialness
As discussed previously, the costs of increased conflict in
family law litigation in terms of its negative impact on parties
and their children are significant.189 And no aspect of the family
law litigation process engenders more conflict than the
presentation of live testimony at a contested hearing. Indeed,
the courtroom confrontation remains a staple of popular culture
vehicles including film, television, and novels, precisely because
of the drama and conflict engendered by such courtroom
confrontations.190 While such drama and conflict may be good for
ratings, they are most certainly destructive for families that
must continue to co-exist and work together after judgment is
rendered.
Sticking with the popular culture theme for a moment, the
1979 Academy Award winning film Kramer v. Kramer was the
first such vehicle to bring broad exposure to the brutality of the
courtroom process for determining child custody disputes.191 In
See supra Part IV(A)(iii).
See generally Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 653, 655–56 (2007); James R. Elkins, Popular Culture, Legal Films, and
Legal Film Critics, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 745, 746 (2007); David Ray Papke, Conventional
Wisdom: The Courtroom Trial in American Popular Culture, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 471, 472
(1999).
191 Michael Asimow, Divorce in the Movies: From the Hays Code to Kramer v. Kramer,
24 LEGAL STUD. F. 221, 222 (2000).
189
190
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the penultimate trial scene in the film, each of the parties’
lawyers destroys the opposing party on cross-examination,
pointing out that party’s every possible failure, both as a parent
and as a human being, in the most exaggerated terms, in order to
sway the decision their way.192 In the film, the father, played by
Dustin Hoffman, leans over to his lawyer after the crossexamination of the mother, played by Meryl Streep, and asks the
lawyer: “Did you have to be so hard on her?” The lawyer’s
response: “Do you want the kid or don’t you?”193
As Hoffman’s lawyer is cross-examining Streep, while the
tears are streaming down the witness’ face, the lawyer insists on
an answer to his question whether she was a bad mother to her
son.194 Hoffman shakes his head and silently whispers the word
“no” to his former wife, even while she admits on the stand to
being a poor parent.195 Of course, in a real courtroom proceeding,
nothing along these lines would take place.196 The father would
at most sit by stoically as his lawyer rips the opposing party to
shreds, and might in fact cheer internally given that the custody
battle, at least for that moment, seems to be going his way. In
any event, the damage to the parties’ ability to cooperate in coparenting the child in the future seems obvious.197
It is true that family law litigation has changed significantly
since the time of Kramer v. Kramer.198 However, it has done so
via the proliferation of extra-judicial means of resolving family
law disputes,199 as has been discussed previously in this paper.200
What happens inside the courtroom, when custody disputes
cannot be resolved outside of it, in terms of live testimony, really

192 See David Ray Papke, Peace Between the Sexes: Law and Gender in Kramer vs.
Kramer, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1199, 1204–05 (1996) (describing scenes from the movie)
[hereinafter Papke, Peace]; Schepard, Kramer, supra note 153, at 681 (describing scenes
from the movie).
193 Schepard, Kramer, supra note 153, at 681. Other scholars have recognized the
brutality of cross-examination, while at the same time recognizing its importance. See,
e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 161 (1990); see generally
Robert P. Lawry, Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within the Central
Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 100 DICK. L. REV. 563 (1996) (exploring themes in crossexamination).
194 Papke, Peace, supra note 192, at 1204–05.
195 Id. at 1205.
196 Id.
197 To be fair, in the film, the mother ultimately relinquishes custody of the child to
the father, even though she prevails in the courtroom proceeding. Schepard, Kramer,
supra note 153, at 681. However, even at the end of the film, there is no indication that
the wounds from the courtroom battle have healed, or that the father and mother will be
able successfully to work together in parenting their child into the future.
198 See, e.g., Schepard & Salem, supra note 8, at 516.
199 Id.; see also SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 175.
200 See Part IV(A)(iii).
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has not changed all that much from the time of the film.201
Again, the costs engendered by the contested courtroom custody
hearing in terms of the parties’ ability to work together in the
future are significant.
Given the significant increase in conflict likely to follow from
the increased reliance on live testimony family law hearings, one
would have to believe that the benefits to result from such an
increase are substantial, in order to make such a change. And
sure enough, the Elkins Task Force displayed what I like to refer
to as a “lawyer’s faith” that the adversary process is the best
available means for the resolution of disputes. Lawyers largely
believe that the presentation of live testimony, through direct
and cross-examination, is the best available means of discovering
truth.202 However, this belief truly is an article of faith, because
there is virtually no empirical evidence that demonstrates that
the use of live testimony, as opposed to other possible fact-finding
methods, including the provision of written or other documentary
submissions, provides for more accurate or reliable judicial
decision making.203
This is particularly true in the area of family law, where all
would agree that there is never one “correct” result of a child
custody dispute, that courts could arrive at if they just employed
better fact-finding and decision making procedures.204 Instead, it
is clear that there exist a range of possible acceptable outcomes
of a custody dispute, and there is no process available that can
demonstrate with certainty which of those outcomes will prove to
be best in the future—given what I previously described as the
“forward-looking” nature of custody determinations.205 In a wellknown article focusing on this indeterminacy in child custody
decision-making, Professor Robert Mnookin only half-jokingly
suggested that child custody determinations should be made by a
coin toss, rather than by the adversary litigation methods
currently employed.206 Mnookin’s point was that given that
201 See SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 83–84 (discussing the events
of a divorce dispute in court).
202 Asimow, Popular Culture, supra note 190, at 653; Edwards, Comments, supra note
152, at 635 (“Many attorneys pride themselves on their ability to use the adversarial
process effectively to win their cases.”); Weinstein, supra note 141, at 84–85 (discussing
lawyers’ stubborn allegiance to the adversary process).
203 See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 32–40 (2007)
(discussing the lack of empirical support for the adversarial system in achieving truth).
204 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 141, at 111–12; cf. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS,
supra note 6, at 25 (“[C]ourtroom combat between parents does not necessarily lead to
wise or just judicial custody decision-making.”).
205 See supra notes 150–63 and accompanying text.
206 Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 289 (Summer 1975).
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adversary litigation methods only marginally improve the odds of
a “correct” determination of child custody disputes over the odds
of a coin toss, the costs of such methods, including time and
expense to the parties and the court system, increased conflict,
etc., do not warrant the employment of such methods.207
Of course few of us would be willing to go so far as Mnookin
suggests and leave child custody determinations to the toss of a
coin.208 Most of us believe that it is worth trying to improve on
the odds of a coin toss in terms of getting better results in child
custody disputes, though we know that arriving at a single,
correct outcome in child custody proceedings is an unattainable
goal. But where the costs of increased use of live testimony are
well documented—in terms of time, expense, and intra-family
conflict—and the benefits of increased use of live testimony are
speculative and ephemeral at best, the Elkins legislation made
the wrong choice in moving toward the increased use of
live testimony. Families would be best served by quick and
determinate custody decisions that would allow them to move
rapidly toward working to make the new arrangement succeed,
rather than drawing out the decision-making process and
increasing the amount of conflict involved.
Another argument that may be made in favor of Elkins’ move
toward live testimony is that whether or not the increased use of
live testimony improves the outcome of child custody disputes,
parents have a due process right to present live testimony in
judicial proceedings that implicate their fundamental right to
determine the nature of the relationship they will have with their
children.209 However, the prioritizing of parental rights over the
child’s interest in minimizing conflict and having the best
possible ongoing relationship with both parents, has been one of
the main focuses of the critics of reliance on adversary litigation
methods as the primary means of resolving family law
disputes.210 While parental rights are certainly an important
concern, the state has parens patriae obligations to ensure the
welfare of children that are equally weighty, and children have
interests that must be considered as well.211 As the California
Supreme Court pointed out, parents’ due process rights are
adequately protected when they have a right to present live

Id. at 289–90.
Mnookin acknowledges as much. Id. at 290–91.
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV.
637, 639–40 (2006); Firestone & Weinstein, supra note 148, at 203–04; Schepard, Kramer,
supra note 153, at 687–88; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 88.
211 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207
208
209
210
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testimony at a final trial in child custody proceedings.212 Due
process does not compel the presentation of live testimony at
motion hearings, as the task force seemed to believe, and
children’s interests in positive family dynamics going forward
outweigh whatever interests parents have in presenting live
testimony at motion hearings.
b. Live Testimony Will Add to Delays in the Family
Law Process and Raise Other Litigation Costs as
Well
One of the Task Force’s major goals was to reduce delay in
family law proceedings. The Task Force rightly noted that delays
can be particularly problematic in family law cases.213 It is clear
that hearings involving live testimony will generally take longer
to conduct than prior hearings where live testimony was the
exception rather than the rule. Given that dockets in family law
departments in California are already overcrowded,214 the new
rules favoring live testimony will only exacerbate such crowding
and delays.215
The Task Force’s response to this concern was to call for
greater devotion of resources to family law cases.216 The Task
Force pointed out that the family law department has
traditionally received short shrift when it comes to budgetary
allocations within the trial court system.217 However, it is simply
reckless to count on increased resources at a time when
California and its courts face an unprecedented budgetary
crisis.218 At least one conspiracy theorist contends that the Task
Force deliberately sought to “crash” the family court system,
making the delivery of greater resources and other reforms
unavoidable.219 A more realistic view is that the Task Force
engaged in a high stakes game of “chicken” with the
Administrative Office of Courts and the Legislature over
increased funding for the family law department.
Given
California’s budgetary realities, this seems like a game the Task
Force is certain to lose, although the real losers will be California
family law litigants who will face even greater delays than is
currently the case in having their cases adjudicated. Those
litigants who can afford it are likely to turn increasingly to
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219

Elkins v. Superior Court, 163 P.3d 160, 170 (Cal. 2007).
ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 39.
See, e.g., Edwards, Comments, supra note 152, at 644–45.
Repa, Reform or Wreckage, supra note 137, at 44.
ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 75.
Id.
Repa, Reform or Wreckage, supra note 137, at 44.
Id. at 43–44.

Do Not Delete

2012]

2/1/2012 2:10 PM

The Elkins Legislation

473

private dispute resolution mechanisms.220 Those who cannot will
be left to deal with the overburdened public system. The
resulting “two-tiered” system for resolving family law disputes—
private for those who can afford it and public for those who
cannot—will be a particularly sad legacy of the Elkins changes.221
The Task Force was also of the view that the current practice
of adjudicating motions primarily through written submissions
increases the cost of family law litigation. It asserted that
attorneys frequently spend a great deal of time drafting and redrafting lengthy declarations,222 driving up the fees charged to
their clients. Such declarations often include hearsay and other
inadmissible material, thus requiring opposing counsel to invest
a great deal of time, again at great cost to the parties, drafting
objections to inadmissible material.223
While these are serious concerns,224 the Task Force’s
assumption that a shift to full blown evidentiary hearings will
mean less attorney time, and therefore less expense to litigants
than prior practice, seems misguided. First of all, it is clear that
the evidentiary hearings themselves will take longer than their
predecessor hearings, as it will take a good deal of time for
witnesses to testify to the evidence to be submitted. Moreover,
given evidentiary objections and other delays that can pop up
during evidentiary hearings, it seems like the increase in time
will be substantial. Also, because many attorneys charge their
clients more for time in court than time spent working outside of
court, it may be that the shift to evidentiary hearings will result
in an increase in attorney’s fees to litigants.
However, even if the Task Force is correct that it will take
less time to present evidence through live testimony than it
would take to present the same evidence in written form, a net
cost savings to clients relies on the assumption that attorneys
will spend virtually no time outside of court preparing for the
evidentiary hearings. But anyone even remotely familiar with
trial practice knows that good trial attorneys spend an
extraordinary amount of time preparing their witness
examinations, as well as preparing the witnesses themselves for
direct and cross-examination. It is downright fanciful to think

Id. at 44.
See Ver Steegh, supra note 167, at 659 (discussing two-tiered justice system that
results from overburdened and under-funded family court systems).
222 ELKINS FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 27.
223 Id.
224 California did address these concerns to a certain extent by modifying its
statewide court rules in family law cases to limit the length of declarations in most
instances to ten pages. See CAL. R. CT. 5.118(f) (as amended effective July 1, 2011).
220
221
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that the shift to live testimony will save attorney time in contrast
to current practice when preparation time and hearing time are
taken into account. Yet even if the Task Force is correct, a
conclusion that clients will save money in attorney’s fees under
the new regime requires a further assumption that attorneys will
stop spending time drafting, filing, and objecting to evidentiary
declarations once the opportunity to present live testimony at
hearings is available. But this too seems like an unfounded
assumption. Attorneys will continue to submit evidentiary
declarations at hearings, in addition to live testimony, at
continued high costs to clients for a variety of reasons.
First, the Elkins decision and section 2009 of the California
Civil Procedure Code make clear that evidentiary declarations
are still admissible at motion hearings despite the Elkins
legislation.225 So attorneys will have to make strategic decisions
about which evidence they wish to present through live
testimony, and which evidence through declaration. Further,
section 217 of the California Family Code and Rule 5.119 of the
California Rules of Court still give judges a great deal of
discretion as to how live testimony is admitted, and what live
testimony to admit. There is a great deal of uncertainty among
family law practitioners regarding exactly how the move to live
testimony will play out in practice.226 Thus, at least until
practice under the Elkins legislation sorts itself out, it is likely
that cautious attorneys will err on the side of presenting evidence
in both formats, rather than risk that the evidence will not be
admitted if one format is relied on to the exclusion of the other.
Indeed, many family law attorneys who are not experienced in
the presentation of live evidence will likely submit evidentiary
declarations to cover in the event that they fail to introduce
successfully certain evidence through live testimony.
Additionally, given the scheduling challenges that are going to be
imposed by the Elkins legislation,227 cautious attorneys will also
present evidentiary declarations to cover for the fact that they
may not be able to secure enough hearing time to present all of
the evidence they wish to present through live testimony. Thus,
the end result is likely to be a combination of live and written
testimony at family law hearings, ultimately increasing the
amount of attorney time involved in preparing for and conducting

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2009 (West 2007).
Repa, Reform or Wreckage, supra note 137, at 44 (“Many family law practitioners
say the recommendations could actually wreak havoc with the panel’s stated goals.”); see
also CAL. FAM. CODE § 217 (West 2011); CAL. R. CT. 5.119 (as amended effective July 1,
2011).
227 See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text.
225
226
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such hearings, resulting in an increase in the cost of litigation to
clients rather than the decrease anticipated by the Task Force.
c. The Issue of Self-Represented Litigants
In recent decades, there has been a virtual explosion in the
number of self-represented litigants appearing in our courts.228
This development has perhaps been most prevalent in the family
law branch of our court system.229 The strains that this
development has placed upon judges, court personnel, and court
systems as a whole are palpable.230 Perhaps more importantly,
the litigants who represent themselves often find their
experiences in the judicial system to be extremely frustrating,231
and there is little doubt that self-represented litigants often
obtain significantly poorer outcomes through their judicial
proceedings than would have been the case had they been
represented by competent counsel.232
Despite these facts, there is little reason to believe that the
flood of self-represented litigants is likely to abate in the
foreseeable future. For this reason, judges, court administrators,
and lawyers have responded with a variety of innovations in
order to address the problems created by the increase in selfrepresentation.233 There is little doubt that both the California
Supreme Court in Elkins, and the Task Force that followed it,
were trying to address both the specific barriers imposed on
Jeffrey Elkins in trying to represent himself effectively in his
individual case, as well as the barriers imposed on selfrepresented litigants more generally in family court. However,

228 See, e.g., Feitz, supra note 31, at 194; Stephen Landsman, The Growing Challenge
of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 439, 440 (2009); Drew A. Swank,
Comment, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 B.Y.U J. PUB. L. 373, 376 (2005) [hereinafter
Swank, Pro Se].
229 See, e.g., Berenson, Family Law, supra note 31, at 110; Goldschmidt, supra note
31, at 36.
230 See, e.g., Berenson, Family Law, supra note 31, at 112 (“The burgeoning number
of self-represented litigants, particularly in the family law area, has placed great
demands on the limited time resources available to court staff.”); Feitz, supra note 31, at
195; Landsman, supra note 228, at 449; Swank, Pro Se, supra note 228, at 384.
231 See Goldschmidt, supra note 31, at 37.
232 See Engler, supra note 33, at 1988.
233 Among these innovations are simplified court forms that laypersons can fill out, in
place of traditional pleadings. Berenson, Family Law, supra note 31, at 123; Margaret B.
Flaherty, Note, How Courts Help You Help Yourself: The Internet and the Pro Se Divorce
Litigant, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 91, 93 (2002). Educational programs to assist self-represented
litigants in filling out these forms and in representing themselves in court have been
provided by court personnel and a variety of legal services providers. See Berenson,
Family Law, supra note 31, at 127; Feitz, supra note 31, at 204; Landsman, supra note
228, at 455–56. Such forms, along with assistance in filling them out, can be made
available online, to make them even more accessible to self-represented litigants.
Flaherty, supra, at 91.
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there are serious questions whether the means chosen by the
Task Force and the subsequent legislation were the best possible
ways to achieve this goal.
The Task Force and the Legislature rejected an approach
that provided detailed rules regarding the steps that need to be
taken prior to their hearings in order for self-represented
litigants to have their evidence considered by the court.234
Instead, they favored an approach that defers most of that work
to the hearings themselves, in terms of decisions regarding the
admissibility of different types of live testimony at the hearing.
But there is no reason to believe that self-represented litigants
will do a better job of navigating the rules of evidence and other
procedural requirements during the course of their hearings than
they did in relation to the pre-trial filings required by prior rules.
Thus, the Task Force and the Legislature seem to rely on the
ability of trial judges to play an active role in assisting selfrepresented litigants to present their cases during hearings,
whereas judges are not able to play such a role with regard to
filings that must be provided prior to hearings.
It is true that a number of academics have similarly focused
on the role of trial judges as a critical component in assisting selfrepresented litigants to present their cases more effectively.235
However, many judges themselves express deep discomfort with
a role that would have them be more active in assisting one or
more of the parties to a dispute in presenting their cases. At
heart, many judges see such a role as violating the fundamental
tenet of judging—neutrality.236 Indeed, particularly where one of
the parties is represented by counsel and one is not, assisting the
self-represented party might even be seen as punishing the
represented party for their decision to retain an attorney.
Further, many judges feel extremely uncomfortable offering
assistance to a litigant when the judge actually knows very little
about the details of, and facts and circumstances surrounding,
the litigant’s case. Add in caseload pressures, frequent rotations
in and out of different trial court departments, and often little
experience with family law, and the primary reliance on trial
See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Baldacci, supra note 33, at 688; Engler, supra note 33, at 2028; Russell
Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing Judicial Role, 22
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 368 (2008); Goldschmidt, supra note 31, at 48.
236 See, e.g., Hon. Robert Bacharach & Lyn Entzeroth, Judicial Advocacy in Pro Se
Litigation: A Return to Neutrality, 42 IND. L. REV. 19, 42–43 (2009); Hon. Gerald W.
Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective, 9
U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 57, 120–21 (2005); see also Drew A. Swank, In Defense of
Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and
Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1583 (2005).
234
235
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judges to help self-represented litigants effectively to present
their cases seems misguided.237
Ultimately, it may be necessary for courts to play a more
active role in assisting self-represented litigants to present their
cases. However, it seems that the burden of dealing with the
self-representation crisis should continue to be shared by judges
with other court personnel, bar associations, legal services
providers, and other public and private resources. Certainly
counties like Contra Costa could have and should have done a
better job of drafting their pre-hearing rules and procedures to be
more accessible to lay persons such as Jeffrey Elkins, and also
could have done more to provide assistance, both inside and
outside of the courthouse, to self-represented litigants in
complying with those rules and procedures. But it is simply too
much to ask trial judges alone to make up for those failures.
ii. Modifying the Role of Minor’s Counsel in Custody Cases
In theory, two distinct approaches are available to provide
children with a “voice” in child custody proceedings. The first
approach involves appointing a GAL to represent the child’s
interest in the litigation.238 The GAL is charged with advancing
the “best interests” of the child in the case.239 While the GAL
may be a lawyer, a non-lawyer may also be appointed.240 The
court may utilize any one of a number of approaches to receiving
the GAL’s input into the decision making process. For example,
the GAL may testify as a witness during the custody proceedings,
but more commonly, the GAL presents a written report to the
court.241
Aside from appointing a GAL, a court may also appoint an
attorney to represent the child in custody proceedings. In such
instances, there is a divergence of roles that can be played by the
child’s attorney. First, to the extent the child is old enough and
mature enough to have formulated an expressed preference
regarding the outcome of the case, the attorney may work to

Repa, Reform or Wreckage, supra note 137, at 30.
See Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 907–08 (“[Guardian ad
litems] advocate for the best interests of the child by conducting an investigation, writing
reports or otherwise making recommendations with some required to inform the court if
the child’s wishes differ . . . .”); Dana E. Prescott, The Guardian Ad Litem in Custody and
Conflict Cases: Investigator, Champion, and Referee?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
529, 537–39 (2000).
239 SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 142.
240 Id. at 143.
241 See Linda D. Elrod, Raising the Bar for Lawyers Who Represent Children: ABA
Standards of Practice for Custody Cases, 37 FAM. L.Q. 105, 115–16 (2003) [hereinafter
Elrod, Raising the Bar].
237
238
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advance the expressed preference of the child.242 Indeed, this is
consistent with the traditional understanding of the role of an
attorney—to advocate for the lawful objectives of the client.243
On the other hand, if the child is either too young or too
immature to express a preference as to the outcome of the
proceedings, or is unwilling to do so, the attorney may represent
the child on a “best interests” or “substituted judgment” basis.244
In practice, jurisdictions are all over the map in terms of the
variations and combinations among these alternatives that are
actually employed. For example, some states provide for the
appointment of an attorney for the child, but define the
attorney’s role similarly to that of a GAL as described above.245
Other states provide for hybrid attorney/GAL roles, or other
variations on the above-described alternatives.246 Further, some
jurisdictions call for attorneys to represent children involved in
custody proceedings on a best interests basis even if the child is
mature enough to express a preference as to the outcome of the
proceedings.247 In such instances, the attorney might advocate
for an outcome that is at odds with the expressed preference of
the child if the attorney believes that the child’s preference is not
the outcome that would be in the child’s best interests.248
Additionally, appointing a GAL and an attorney are not
mutually exclusive options. A court may be able to appoint both
in the same case.249 In such circumstances, the most common
approach is for the attorney to act as lawyer for the GAL, who
stands in the place of the child client in terms of directing the
lawyer’s activities. However, it would be possible in some
circumstances for the attorney to advocate for the child’s
expressed wishes, and for the GAL to advocate for what the GAL
believes to be in the child’s best interests—where the GAL
242 See Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 911; SCHEPARD, CHILDREN,
COURTS, supra note 6, at 142.
243 See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468,
470–71 (1990).
244 See Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 910–11.
245 See Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 391 (“[M]ost states in the United
States continue to permit children’s lawyers to engage in best interests representation.”);
Barbara Ann Atwood, The Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and
Custody Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide Between Pragmatism and Idealism, 42 FAM.
L.Q. 63, 75 (2008) [hereinafter Atwood, Bridging the Divide] (“[M]any states routinely
appoint lawyers as guardians ad litem without careful delineation of the distinctions
between the two roles.”); Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 908.
246 See Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 391–92; Elrod, Client-Directed
Lawyers, supra note 36, at 908–09.
247 See supra notes 37–42 (discussing California law and the role of the lawyer).
248 See, e.g., SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 144 (discussing
Carballeira v. Shumway, 710 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)).
249 Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 391–92.
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believes that the child’s expressed preferences are contrary to
their best interests.
However, in family court, there are
generally no public resources to pay for either GALs or attorneys
for children in custody cases.250 Given, as discussed above, that
most parties do not even hire attorneys to represent themselves
in custody proceedings, it seems unlikely that most parties will
have the resources to pay for either an attorney for the child, or a
GAL, let alone both, in the context of custody proceedings. Thus,
child representation, in whatever form, is the exception, rather
than the rule in custody proceedings.
In California, prior to the Elkins legislation, the statutory
scheme for child representation in family court should perhaps be
described as a combination between the roles of GAL and best
interests attorney. Formally, California law did not provide for
the appointment of a GAL in family court.251 However, sections
3150 and 3151 of the California Family Code do allow a court to
appoint counsel to represent the child in custody proceedings if
the court determines that doing so would be in the child’s best
interests.252 Further, under section 3151, the child’s attorney is
to represent the best interests of the child.253 And, under the
prior version of section 3151, the court could require the child’s
attorney to submit a written “statement of issues and contentions
setting forth the facts that bear on the best interests of the
child.”254 Such a statement was virtually indistinguishable from
the report traditionally prepared by a GAL for the court.
There has been a tremendous amount of discussion in recent
years among legal scholars and advocates for children regarding
the appropriate role for attorneys representing children in child
custody proceedings.255 Though the discussion has often been
250 SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 147. By contrast, most states
provide funding to pay for representation for children in juvenile court proceedings. See
supra note 34.
251 In re Marriage of Lloyd, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, 39–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
252 CAL. FAM. CODE § 3150(a) (West 2004).
253 FAM. § 3151(a) (West 2011).
254 FAM. § 3151(b) (West 1998), amended by Stats. 2010 ch. 352 § 15 (AB 939)
(effective Jan. 1, 2011); Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, supra note 41, at 116.
255 Two conferences, attended by many of the nation’s leading children’s law scholars
and advocates, taking place a decade apart, published recommendations regarding the
appropriate role for lawyers to play in representing children. See generally
Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of
Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996); Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on
Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham,
6 NEV. L.J. 592 (2006).
Further, a number of professional organizations have
promulgated standards offered to guide attorneys in the representation of children. For
example, in 2003 the American Bar Association promulgated its Standards of Practice for
Lawyers Representing Children in Custody Cases, reprinted in 37 FAM. L.Q. 131 (2003).
In 2006, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) (formerly known as the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law) offered its Uniform Representation
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heated, it seems that a broad consensus has emerged from this
debate regarding a couple of points. The first is that lawyers
should act like lawyers in custody proceedings, and not like
GALs.256
Thus, lawyers should be limited to presenting
information to the court in the manner that lawyers have
traditionally presented information to the court—through
admissible evidence and proper legal argument. Therefore,
lawyers should be prohibited from offering personal opinions
regarding the outcome of custody proceedings, from testifying as
witnesses in custody proceedings, and offering reports to the
court, like GALs traditionally offered, containing hearsay and
other inadmissible evidence.257
The second point of consensus to emerge from this debate is,
at least in circumstances where the child is mature enough to
express a preference regarding the outcome of the proceedings,
that best interests representation is inappropriate, and that the
attorney for the child should adhere to the traditionally accepted
role for counsel of advocating for the lawful preferences of their
client.258 Two separate justifications have been advanced for this
second point.
First, it is contended that best interests
representation is incompatible with the basic ethical
requirements of attorney representation, because the
agent/lawyer is freed from following the directives of the
principal/client.259 The other justification is that, to the extent
best interests representation allows the child’s attorney to
advocate for an outcome that is contradictory to the expressed
preferences of the child, the child is essentially deprived of
having a voice relating to the outcome of the proceedings that are
supposed to be primarily about the child to begin with.260 Many
would contend that children have a right of some type, to have
their preferences heard and considered in proceedings that will
of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act. UNIFORM REPRESENTATION
OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS ACT (2007). However, a
contentious debate caused the ULC to withdraw the Act from consideration by the ABA
House of Delegates. See Atwood, Bridging the Divide, supra note 245, at 72–73; Martin
Guggenheim, The AAML’s Revised Standards for Representing Children in Custody and
Visitation Proceedings: The Reporter’s Perspective, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW.
251, 269–75 (2009) [hereinafter Guggenheim, AAML]. And, in 2009, the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers promulgated its Standards for Attorneys and GALs in
custody proceedings. Am. Acad. of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing Children:
Standards for Attorneys for Children in Custody or Visitation Proceedings with
Commentary, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 227 (2009). For an overview of each of
these proposals, see Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 387–89.
256 See, e.g., Elrod, Raising the Bar, supra note 241, at 115–19.
257 Id.
258 See Atwood, Bridging the Divide, supra note 245, at 90–91.
259 Id. at 92.
260 Id.
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have such a dramatic effect on the child’s life,261 and that best
interests representation deprives the child of that voice.
The consensus disappears, to a certain extent, for children
who either cannot, or will not express a preference regarding the
outcome of the proceedings, whether due to age, incapacity, or
another reason. In such circumstances, some scholars and child
advocates would allow for best interests representation.262 On
the other hand, others would argue that child representation
should be forgone entirely in such circumstances.263
On review, it is clear that the Elkins legislation is halfway
consistent with the scholarly consensus described above. First,
the change to section 3151 that prevents judges from requiring
children’s lawyers to submit a statement of issues and
contentions is consistent with the view that lawyers should act as
lawyers in custody proceedings, and should be prohibited from
acting as GALs traditionally have.264 On the other hand, the
Elkins legislation also maintains best interests representation as
the role to be played by children’s lawyers in custody
proceedings.265 While it is true that the revised section 3151
requires children’s lawyers to present the child’s wishes to the
court if the child so requests (the former statute gave the child’s
lawyer discretion whether or not to present the child’s wishes to
the court),266 it still allows the lawyer to argue against the child’s
expressed preference if the lawyer believes that doing so is in the
child’s best interests.
The result of the Elkins legislation is a somewhat incoherent
role for children’s attorneys in California custody proceedings.
On the one hand, lawyers will be confined to their traditional
roles of presenting admissible evidence and argument in support
of their positions in court. On the other hand, they will continue
to be required to pursue the best interests of their child clients,
despite the arguments that best interests representation is
incompatible with the traditional role of an attorney as an
advocate for the lawful pursuits of their client. Further though,
lawyers for children will be required to present the child’s
See infra notes 282–83 and accompanying text.
See Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 423 (“If lawyers should take on a
broader ‘moral’ view of their responsibilities vis-à-vis their clients with full capacity, a
lawyer for a child who cannot direct counsel surely acts within his or her professional role
when pursuing that client’s interests.”).
263 Guggenheim, AAML, supra note 255, at 278 (explaining that restricting a child’s
lawyer’s role to enforcing substantive rights can significantly restrict the lawyer’s
prerogatives).
264 See supra notes 251–54 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text.
266 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
261
262
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preference to the court, even where the lawyer believes that
preference to be incompatible with the very best interests of the
child that the lawyer has been charged with pursuing.
This author somewhat reluctantly agrees with the Elkins
legislation’s decision to confine children’s attorneys to the
presentation of admissible evidence and argument at trial, rather
than presenting a statement of issues and contentions, testifying
as a witness, or stating a personal opinion regarding the outcome
of the proceedings. The policies behind the well-entrenched
“advocate-witness rule,”267 support the notion that GAL-like
functions are incompatible with the role of an attorney
representing a client in contested litigation.268 However, while it
is appropriate that lawyers be required to act as lawyers at all
times, forcing lawyers into a more traditional role as adversary
advocates is also likely to further increase the “adversarialness”
of child custody proceedings, a result that was decried in
previous parts of this paper.
Additionally, it does seem that something important is lost
in depriving the court of the potentially important source of
relatively neutral information that can come from child
attorneys’ statements of issues and contentions.269 Alas, as has
been pointed out previously, too often parents enmeshed in hotly
contested custody disputes lose sight of their children’s best
interests.270 In such circumstances, the court really is in a
position to benefit from a relatively neutral, yet thorough
examination of the issues and evidence in the case. California
law does provide for input from a wide variety of such non-party
sources in custody litigation including custody evaluators,
psychologists, and parenting coordinators.
However, as

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2007). Rule 3.7 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to
be a necessary witness unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the
lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so
by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.
268 The essential conflict is between the lawyer’s obligation as an advocate to advance
the interests of their client with the lawyer’s obligation as a witness to be completely
candid with the court, even if the resulting testimony will be adverse to the client’s
objectives. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers as Witnesses, 36 N.M. L. REV. 47, 48–
49 (2006).
269 Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, supra note 41, at 116–17.
270 See supra notes 152–65 and accompanying text.
267
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mentioned above, the economic realities of private party custody
litigation are such that the availability of such independent
evaluations is likely to be strictly limited in most cases. 271
Indeed, the value of a statement of issues and contentions is
consistent with the availability of evaluative mediation in
California custody cases. While this paper was critical of
evaluative mediation earlier,272 that criticism was based upon: (1)
the incompatibility of the mediator’s role as a facilitator of
agreements and the role of recommending counselor, and (2) the
limitations on the mediator’s ability to engage in reliable factfinding in support of her recommendations. Relating to the
latter, because the mediator has no authority to engage in factfinding, other than through the unsworn statements of the
parties during a single, short mediation session, the factual
findings relied on by mediators in making their recommendations
are particularly suspect.
By contrast, children’s attorneys
writing statements of issues and contentions had a much greater
opportunity, and indeed an obligation, to interview witnesses,
review documents, and engage in a wide variety of other fact
finding activities that made the basis for their recommendations
much more reliable than those relied on by mediators in making
their recommendations.273
Still, the incompatibility of the child attorney’s role with that
of a GAL makes clear to me that the change away from
statements of issues and contentions is proper. Yet, in order to
make up for what was lost in making that change, the Elkins
legislation should have simultaneously created the authority on
the part of the family court to appoint a non-lawyer GAL in
instances where it would be beneficial to do so. That way, the
court would still have the benefits of a statement of issues and
contentions, without bringing about the conflicts inherent in
having the child’s attorney prepare such a report. As outlined
above, resource limitations will probably make it unlikely that in
many cases courts will appoint both a GAL and an attorney for
the child, but the Elkins legislation should have established the
possibility to do so, where such a result would serve the best
interests of the child, and resources will allow for it.
Establishing the ability to appoint a GAL in limited
circumstances would also have allowed the Elkins legislation to
abandon best interests representation, and bring California law
into line with the emerging consensus among legal scholars and
271
272
273

See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 179–85 and accompanying text.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3151(a) (West 2006).
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children’s advocates that such representation is inappropriate.274
I have more confidence in attorneys’ ability to engage in best
interests representation in a professionally appropriate manner
than most of the critics of best interests representation.275
Indeed, there is evidence that attorneys who represent children
in practice actually engage in something of a hybrid between best
interests and child’s preference representation regardless of the
label placed on their appointment.276
Nonetheless, the
availability of a GAL where appropriate would allow California
to move from best interests representation to child preference,
thus rendering the child’s attorney’s role to be more in line with
the move away from statements of issues and contentions and
toward traditional attorney advocacy. In cases where the child is
too young or is unwilling to express a preference to direct her
lawyer’s performance, the court could appoint a non-lawyer GAL,
either with or without a lawyer to represent the child/GAL.
Similarly, the court could also appoint a GAL for an older child if
there was reason to believe that the child’s preference being
advocated by the child’s attorney was potentially adverse to the
child’s best interests. Thus, the Elkins legislation should have
provided for GALs in family law cases and abandoned best
interests attorney representation in favor of child preference
advocacy where the child is mature enough to state a reasoned
preference.
iii. Increased Use of Child Testimony in Custody Cases
Though not part of the Elkins legislation itself, AB 1050 was
enacted around the same time as the Elkins legislation, and
clearly furthers the Elkins Commission’s objective of giving
children a greater “voice” in child custody proceedings. Prior to
its amendment via AB 1050, section 3042 of the California
Family Code, did provide that “[i]f a child is of sufficient age and
capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to
custody, the court shall consider and give due weight to the
wishes of the child in making an order granting or modifying
custody.”277 The statute also granted the court considerable
latitude to determine the manner in which the child’s preference
would be ascertained, so as to best protect the interests of the
child.278

See supra notes 255–57 and accompanying text.
Accord Atwood, Best Interests, supra note 44, at 412–13.
See, e.g., Leary v. Leary, 627 A.2d 30, 36–42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (child’s
attorney properly balanced child advocacy and reporting roles in custody litigation).
277 FAM. § 3042(a) (amended 2010).
278 FAM. § 3042(b).
274
275
276
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As amended, section 3042 mandates: “If the child is 14 years
of age or older and wishes to address the court regarding custody
or visitation, the child shall be permitted to do so, unless the
court determines that doing so is not in the child’s best
interests.”279
If the court determines that allowing the child to address the
court with regard to her preference is not in the child’s best
interests, the court must state its reasons for that finding on the
record.280 The revised statute goes on to make clear that nothing
in the above-quoted provision shall be construed to prevent a
child who is less than fourteen years of age from addressing the
court with regard to custody or visitation.281
There is nearly universal agreement that the views of
children who are mature enough to have an opinion regarding
the custody arrangements that will affect them at a minimum
should be considered in determining those custody
arrangements.282 Indeed, the widely-ratified United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes a right of
participation on the part of children in legal proceedings affecting
their interests.283 After all, it is the child who must live with
decisions that are made regarding where the child will reside,
which parent the child will spend the bulk of her time with,
where the child will go to school, etc. However, consensus is
much more elusive when it comes to questions of the weight that
should be placed on the child’s preference regarding custody
arrangements, as well as the manner in which the child’s input
into the custody proceedings should be obtained.
There is also widespread agreement, at least among
psychologists, if not among lawyers and children’s rights
advocates, that placing children “in the middle” of custody
disputes between their parents may subject the children to
significant psychological harm.284 Placing significant weight on
FAM. § 3042(c) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
FAM. § 3042(c).
FAM. § 3042(d).
See Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical
Reflections on Lawyering for Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573, 575 (2008);
Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers, supra note 36, at 870; Cynthia Starnes, Swords in the
Hands of Babes: Rethinking Custody Interviews After Troxel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 115, 123
(2003).
283 Appell, supra note 282, at 575 & nn.3–4 (noting that the United States is one of
only two countries that have failed to ratify the treaty).
284 See, e.g., EMERY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, supra note 48, at 20; Robert E. Emery,
Children’s Voices: Listening—and Deciding—is an Adult Responsibility, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
621, 623 (2003) [hereinafter Emery, Children’s Voices]; Richard A. Warshak, Payoffs and
Pitfalls of Listening to Children, 52 FAM. REL. 373, 374–76 (2003); Firestone & Weinstein,
supra note 148, at 206–07; Weinstein, supra note 141, at 126.
279
280
281
282
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the child’s preference places the child at risk of being
manipulated or pressured, intentionally or unintentionally, by
one or both of the parents.285 A variety of tactics may be
employed by a parent to corrupt a child’s view of the other
parent.286 The damage that may result to the child’s relationship
with the other parent may be difficult to undo.287 Further, a
child’s preference as to custody may be influenced by fear of a
parent, in the event the child chooses to reside with the other
parent, or excessive concern for the welfare of a parent who may
feel abandonment if the child chooses to live with the other
parent.288 And, of course, children are susceptible to being
“bribed” by a parent in the form of gifts, excessively lenient
household rules, etc.289 Even absent any form of undue influence
being exerted on the child, the mere fact of having to choose
between two parents that the child loves places an enormous
burden on the child, that most would wish to avoid.290
Two factors seem likely to exacerbate the potential harm
caused to children through involvement in their parents’ custody
disputes. The first relates to the weight to be accorded to the
child’s preference. The second relates to the manner in which the
child’s preference will be ascertained and presented to the court
for consideration. As to the first, it stands to reason that the
more weight that will be placed upon a child’s preference in
deciding custody proceedings, the more pressure the child will
feel in stating their preference, and the more susceptible the
child will be to manipulation and other tactics that may cause
long-term detriment to the child.
As to the second, there are a number of possible ways that a
child’s preference may be introduced for consideration by the
court in reaching a decision with regard to a custody dispute.
For example, the child’s preference could be solicited by minor’s
counsel, a GAL, a mediator/recommending counselor, a custody
evaluator, or by the judge herself in camera. Alternatively, the
child’s preference may be elicited through testimony in open
court, with the child subject to cross-examination by the parties’
attorneys, and perhaps by minor’s counsel as well. Common
sense suggests that the more private and non-coercive means
used to elicit the child’s preference, the less pressure these
Warshak, supra note 284, at 375.
Id.; see, e.g., Kathleen Nemechek, Note, Child Preference in Custody Decisions:
Where We Have Been, Where We Are Now, Where We Should Go, 83 IOWA L. REV. 437, 462
(1998).
287 Warshak, supra note 284, at 375.
288 Id.
289 Nemecheck, supra note 286, at 462.
290 Starnes, supra note 282, at 124.
285
286
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procedures are likely to place on the child, and the less damage
that is likely to be incurred. On the other hand, the more public
and coercive the means used to elicit the child’s preference, the
more harmful such proceedings are likely to be to the child’s
long-term psychological interests. Indeed, the legal literature is
replete with accounts of the damage caused to adult witnesses,
often ones with little stake in the outcome of the proceedings,
caused by rigorous cross-examination.291 One can only imagine
the harm to a child of being rigorously cross-examined,
potentially by three separate lawyers, in a proceeding that is
going to determine the future course of the child’s life.
It is thus possible to imagine a continuum of possibilities for
incorporating a child’s voice into a custody dispute. On the most
advantageous side, concerned parents would delicately and
privately seek information relating to the child’s preference with
regard to a custody determination.
Such an information
gathering process might not even directly raise the issue of
custody with the child, but rather would seek out the child’s
views indirectly, through questions that would not directly
threaten or place the child in the middle of the custody dispute.292
The parents would then privately reach agreement as to a
custody arrangement that would give consideration to the child’s
preferences, along with other factors relating to the child’s best
interests.293
On the other hand, we can also imagine a scenario where
parents involved in high-conflict litigation might solicit the
child’s input through interviews with each parent’s retained
counsel, and place implicit or explicit pressure on the child to
express a preference in favor of that parent. The child’s
preference will then be presented to the court through live
testimony, subject to rigorous cross-examination by the nonfavored parent’s attorney.
Naturally, one would conclude that the first scenario is
preferable in terms of incorporating the child’s voice into custody
disputes. As stated by Professor Andrew Schepard:
Even the most vigorous advocates of considering a child’s preference
in a custody dispute do not suggest that the child should be sworn as a
witness and cross-examined by his or her parents’ lawyers in front of

See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Emery, Children’s Voices, supra note 284, at 622–26 (describing a case
study and an example to illustrate ways to communicate with children to lessen their
burden).
293 Id. at 626.
291
292
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his or her parents. They recognize that a courtroom confrontation of
this sort could irreparably poison the parent-child relationship.294

However, I fear that the changes to section 3042 of the
California Family Code move us precisely in that direction. It is
true that even as amended, section 3042 does not require a child
to express a preference as to custody, nor does it require any
preference to be presented through child testimony. However,
the legislative changes significantly increase the likelihood of
both occurrences.
The former section 3042 was broad enough to allow for a
child’s preference to be considered in custody proceedings, and for
that preference to be expressed through child testimony where
appropriate. However, the new section 3042 clearly increases the
likelihood that the child will be drawn into the middle of custody
litigation by expressing a preference on the record. Now, the
court cannot deny the right of a child fourteen years of age or
older to state a preference in the case, unless the court makes
written findings as to why it would not be in the best interests of
the child to do so—a significant deterrent to trial judges who are
often loathe to take the time and effort to make such written
findings. Further, the clear legislative intent behind the changes
was to increase the consideration of child preference in custody
proceedings, otherwise there would have been no point in
amending the statute to begin with. Judges are likely to get the
message of the point behind the statutory change in applying
their authority regarding the consideration of child preference in
custody litigation. Further, subsection (e) of the amended statute
requires the court to provide alternative means of soliciting input
from the child as to the child’s preference should the court
preclude calling the child as a witness.295 This provision seems to
set up live testimony as the default mechanism for receiving
input from the child, with all other means offered as second
alternatives. It is almost certain to have the effect of causing
more children to testify in their parents’ custody cases.296
Drawing children further into the middle of their parents’
custody disputes seems particularly problematic in light of the
other previously discussed changes from the Elkins legislation
that are likely to increase the adversarial nature of custody
litigation. Increasing the acrimony of custody battles, and then
placing children squarely in the middle of them, runs precisely
counter to the findings of a generation of scholars who have

294
295
296

SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 140–41.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042(e) (West 2011).
See Pellman, A Child-Centered Response, supra note 41, at 113–14.
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studied the harms to children that result from their involvement
in such proceedings.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The legislative changes that are the focus of this article are
misguided because they run directly counter to the salutary,
decades-long trend in family law away from reliance on
traditional, adversary litigation as the primary means of
resolving family law disputes. Adversary litigation has been
shown, in many instances, to be costly and damaging to the
relationships of the parties involved in family law cases, and
particularly harmful to children who are dragged into the vortex
of their parents’ disputes, and then subject to the continuing
effects of the strain placed upon the parents’ ability to cooperate
in raising the children into the future. Yet the increased use of
live testimony in family law motion hearings, the redefinition of
the role of minor’s counsel in custody cases to more closely
resemble that of adversarial advocates, and the increased
reliance on child testimony in custody cases will all have the
effect of moving California back in the direction of adversarialism
in family law litigation.
The goals of the California Supreme Court in the Elkins
decision, and the corresponding task force, could have been
achieved through other measures that would not have had the
negative consequence of increased adversarialism. Here are
some recommendations.
A. Eliminate Evaluative Mediation in Custody Cases
There is virtually universal agreement that except in rare
cases involving domestic violence or other gross disparities in
capacity between spouses, negotiated agreements in family law
cases benefit both the parties to the dispute, the court system as
a whole, and the children who are the subject of the dispute.297
Parties are more likely to be satisfied with agreements that they
play a central role in creating than orders generated by a judge
who is less knowledgeable about the circumstances of the parties
then they are themselves. Negotiated settlements also free up
court time to address cases that are resistant to settlement.
Thus, steps that will result in more settlements of family law
disputes are generally viewed as being positive.
Eliminating evaluative mediation will result in more
settlements in family law cases. As pointed out above, requiring

297

See, e.g., Schepard, Kramer, supra note 153, at 682.
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neutrals to play the conflicting roles of mediator and evaluator
reduces their effectiveness in the former role, thus decreasing the
likelihood of mediated agreements.298
Also, parties must
approach mediation in an adversarial stance, prepared to
communicate all information that might help them obtain a
favorable recommendation from the counselor, thus greatly
increasing their likelihood of success before the court should the
mediation session fail to produce an agreement. Yet such an
adversarial stance is inimical to the kind of cooperative stance
that is most likely to result in a successful outcome in mediation.
B. Live Testimony Should Remain Limited in Family Law
Motion Hearings
For reasons stated above, the increased use of live testimony
in family law motion hearings is unlikely to achieve better
results in such proceedings, will increase adversarialness in
family law litigation with its corresponding costs, and will
further contribute to backlogs and delays in the family law
department at this time of unprecedented budget pressures in
California. 299 Moreover, the change will not achieve the Elkins
reforms’ primary goal of making the courts more accessible to
self-represented litigants, because such litigants are no more
likely to successfully present their cases through live testimony
than they would through written submissions.
Rather than placing the entire burden for solving the
challenges presented by the explosion of self-representation in
family court on trial judges who will preside over evidentiary
hearings, the burden of addressing these challenges should be
shared equally by the bench, the bar, and court administrators.
The Judicial Council, counties, courts, and other drafters of
procedural rules must do a better job of drafting court rules in a
manner that will be comprehensible to self-represented litigants,
and will serve as effective guides in helping litigants present
their issues to the court in a manner that will assist the court in
reaching a proper result, whether those presentations will take
place in oral or written form. New, revised, and simplified court
forms can play a role in assisting litigants in these tasks. Such
rules and forms should be made widely available to litigants via
the internet, and other technologies for those who do not have
easy internet access.
More assistance must also be provided to self-represented
litigants in preparing their cases, both inside and outside the
298
299

See supra notes 179–85 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV(B)(i).
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courthouse. In addition to free assistance through court based
and other pro bono programs, the private bar should continue to
consider means for providing limited legal assistance to selfrepresented litigants in preparing their cases to present to the
court. Though there has been an increase in the provision of
such “unbundled” legal services,300 more can be done. Though it
is true that many self-represented litigants are too poor to afford
to pay for any legal services whatsoever, it is clear that many
self-represented litigants have the means to pay for at least some
legal services,301 but choose not to do so, either because they don’t
want to invite the additional adversarialness engendered by
traditional, full-blown adversary legal representation, or because
they don’t see the value added in paying for legal services.302
However, providing limited assistance in preparing cases for
court might mutually serve both the courts’ and litigants’
interests in effective presentation of cases, and attorneys’
interests in obtaining business from segments of the population
who have traditionally declined to employ their services.
Paralegal and other non-attorney assistance may also be
appropriate in helping self-represented litigants to prepare their
cases to be presented effectively in court, to the extent that
appropriate regulation and quality assurance can be provided for
such services.303
Together, these steps should avoid the need for live
testimony in many motion hearings. And, retaining the right to
present any and all necessary testimony should the family law
dispute require a full trial on the merits, will address the due
process concerns raised by the California Supreme Court in
Elkins.
C. Adopt Traditional Attorney Representation for Children in
Custody Cases Along with Explicit Recognition of a GAL Role
The Elkins legislation offers an incoherent role for children’s
counsel by recasting the role of counsel as a traditional adversary
advocate in all respects except the most fundamental one,
advancing the lawful objectives of the client. California should
have gone all the way toward allowing “lawyers to be lawyers” in
custody disputes by eliminating best interests representation.
On the other hand, California should expressly recognize a role of
See, e.g., Feitz, supra note 31, at 202.
See, e.g., SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 40.
See, e.g., Swank, supra note 236, at 1573–74.
See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 869, 885–86 (2009) (discussing steps that could be taken to allay “concerns about
unqualified or unethical lay assistance”).
300
301
302
303
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GAL in custody disputes. While it will be the rare case where
both minor’s counsel and a GAL will be employed, authorization
to appoint a GAL will preserve the opportunity to have an adult
present the best interests of the child, when the child herself is
either unable, or unwilling to do so, or there is a serious risk that
the expressed preference of an older child presents a serious risk
of harm to the child. Additionally, the ability of a court to
appoint a GAL will make up for the elimination of “statements of
issues and contentions” from the current legislation and present
the opportunity to provide courts with a thoroughly researched,
yet relatively objective presentation of the important facts
relating to the custody determination, in a manner that neither
the parties’ attorneys, nor the court itself, would otherwise be
able to provide.
D. Child Testimony Should Be a Last, Not a First Resort in
Custody Litigation
Few would dispute that on the witness stand, testifying in
one’s parents’ custody case is one of the last places a child would
want to be. Legislation that makes it more likely, rather than
less likely that children will be placed in exactly that position is
misguided. While it will certainly be appropriate, indeed even
necessary in some cases, to have a child testify in custody
proceedings, the goal should be to limit those instances, rather
than to increase them. Pre-existing California law was adequate
to give judges, parents, lawyers, other professionals, and the
children themselves, the flexibility to make sure that children
have an opportunity to be heard regarding custody decisions that
will have an enormous impact upon their lives, and to determine
the appropriate manner in which the child’s views will be
presented. What is needed is for the involved persons to exercise
that discretion appropriately, rather than to place a thumb on
the scale in favor of child testimony.
CONCLUSION
Only time will tell if the latest set of family law reforms in
California will catch on in the rest of the country as has
happened so many times in the past. However, it is this author’s
hope that they do not. The recent steps back in the direction of
increased adversarialism in family law litigation mark a
mistaken reversal of course by a state that led the path away
from such adversarialism over the past few decades. Does
anyone really want to return to the days when custody disputes
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were a legal “battle to the death,”304 with little concern for the
casualties created along the way? Hopefully, other states will
answer this question “no,” and decline to follow California’s lead
in family law this time around.

304 SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, supra note 6, at 12 (discussing the film Kramer v.
Kramer and the manner in which custody cases were determined around the time (1979)
the film was released).

